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CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION IN 
HEALTH CARE 
ERIN C. FUSE BROWN * 
ABSTRACT 
There are inadequate consumer protections from harmful medical 
billing practices that result in unavoidable, unexpected, and often 
financially devastating medical bills. The problem stems from the 
increasing costs shifting to patients in American health care and the 
inordinate complexity that makes health care transactions nearly 
impossible for consumers to navigate. A particularly outrageous example 
is the phenomenon of surprise medical bills, which refers to unanticipated 
and involuntary out-of-network bills in emergencies or from out-of-
network providers at in-network facilities. Other damaging medical billing 
practices include the opaque and à la carte nature of medical bills, 
epitomized by added “facility fees,” as well as harsh medical debt 
collection and credit reporting practices. The impetus of this article was 
driven by the simple questions: Are these harmful health care billing 
practices legal? And if so, what can be done to protect patients as 
consumers? The questions are simple but the answers are not. This article 
canvasses a growing body of financial protections under federal and state 
law for health care consumers and concludes that, notwithstanding these 
significant efforts, consumer financial protections are inadequate for most 
health care consumers in the United States. This article sets forth a model 
set of policy reforms that build upon state reforms to protect health care 
consumers. The biggest gaps in protection, however, are structural—the 
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
preempts many state efforts to protect the large and growing number of 
health care consumers who are insured by self-funded employer health 
plans. Despite salutary state innovation in the area of patient financial 
protection, ERISA’s growing preemptive sweep means a federal solution is 
necessary to protect all health care consumers from medical-billing 
abuses.  
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Jaime King, Paul Lombardo, Timothy Lytton, Frank Pasquale, Nicolas Terry, and Anne Tucker for 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Public school teacher and father of three, John Elfrank-Dana, slipped 
on the steps of the subway and hit his head, ending up with a serious 
injury requiring emergency cranial surgery.1 Although Elfrank-Dana went 
to an emergency room that was within his insurance network, some of the 
physicians who treated him were out-of-network, which meant that he 
faced $106,000 in medical bills for inadvertent out-of-network care that 
was not covered by his insurance. His insurance covered a portion of the 
bill, but there was nothing to prevent the out-of-network physicians from 
billing Elfrank-Dana for the difference between the amount his insurance 
plan paid and their full charges.2 Such surprise medical bills are not 
limited to emergencies—Peter Drier underwent a planned surgery to repair 
herniated disks from his orthopedist, who was in-network, at an in-
network hospital.3 Nevertheless, Drier received a $117,000 bill from a 
surgeon he had never met who stepped in to assist with his operation. The 
surgeon was out-of-network, which meant Drier was on the hook for the 
six-figure difference between the surgeon’s full charges and what his 
insurance covered.4 
Surprise medical bills are not the only problems health care consumers 
face. Another frustration stems from the opaque and à la carte nature of 
medical bills, such as the unanticipated facility fees that may be added to a 
physician’s fees for outpatient care. David Hubbard had a heart condition 
and required periodic echocardiograms.5 When he went to receive his 
routine echocardiogram at his cardiologist’s office, he was shocked that 
the fee had jumped to $1605 from $373 just six months earlier.6 Nothing 
about the service had changed, except that his cardiologist’s practice was 
purchased by a local hospital system and was able to bill an added facility 
 
 
 1.  Haley Sweetland Edwards, How You Could Get Hit with a Surprise Medical Bill, TIME, Mar. 
7, 2016, available at http://time.com/4246845/health-care-insurance-suprise-medical-bill/. 
 2.  Id. “Charges” are health care providers’ list prices, from which health plan discounts are 
negotiated. Full charges are often two to three times, and as much as ten times greater than negotiated 
prices. See Ge Bai & Gerard Anderson, Extreme Markup: The Fifty US Hospitals with the Highest 
Charge-to-Cost Ratios, 34 HEALTH AFF. 922, 927 (2015); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of US 
Hospital Services: Chaos Behind the Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 58–59 (2006). 
 3.  Elisabeth Rosenthal, After Surgery, Surprise $117,000 Medical Bill from Doctor He Didn’t 
Know, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2014, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/us/drive-by-
doctoring-surprise-medical-bills.html?_r=1.  
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Anna Wilde Mathews, Same Doctor Visit, Double the Cost, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2012, 
10:19 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443713704577601113671007448. 
 6.  Id. 
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fee as an outpatient department of the hospital.7 
Even consumers who try to protect themselves cannot always avoid 
unexpected medical bills. When Rod’s wife, Debbie, developed chest 
pains, Rod tried to shop around.8 He used an app provided by their insurer, 
Aetna, to compare prices of emergency rooms nearby. At First Choice, the 
freestanding ER they selected, they tried to get a sense of how much the 
visit would cost, but no one at First Choice would give them a cost 
estimate. First Choice’s staff assured them, however, they would not be 
charged a facility fee. Their $4605 bill for the visit ended up including a 
$2258 facility fee. The bill was sent to a collection agency, which can 
occur even while the patients are in the process of disputing or verifying 
their charges and coordinating with their insurer over how much they 
owe.9 Although Rod and Debbie resolved their billing dispute, other 
patients are not so lucky, with some discovering that their medical bills 
have harmed their creditworthiness or worse, that they are being sued by a 
debt collector for their unpaid bills.10 
These stories paint a fairly common picture of a health care consumer’s 
financial experience with the health care system. Prior to their health care 
encounter, patients face inscrutable price opacity as they try to anticipate 
the financial ramifications of touching the health care system. The 
financial distress mounts after the service has been rendered, with the 
arrival of involuntarily triggered, surprise out-of-network medical bills or 
added facility fees. The ordeal continues as the patient tries to sort out the 
confusing pile of medical bills and insurance statements while unpaid 
amounts are sold to debt collectors and reported to credit reporting 
agencies, where the medical bill can become a lawsuit, a damaged credit 
score, a home foreclosure, or worse.  
The United States is the only economically developed country where a 
slip and fall and a trip to the emergency room could spell financial ruin or 
bankruptcy.11 With the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Olga Khazan, The Agony of Medical Bills, ATLANTIC, May 21, 2015, available at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/05/the-agony-of-surprise-medical-bills/393785/.   
 9.  See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, When Health Costs Harm Your Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 
2014, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/sunday-review/when-health-costs-harm-your-
credit.html.  
 10.  See, e.g., Paul Kiel & Chris Arnold, From the E.R. to the Courtroom: How Nonprofit 
Hospitals Are Seizing Patients’ Wages, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/how-nonprofit-hospitals-are-seizing-patients-wages.  
 11.  See DAVID SQUIRES & CHLOE ANDERSON, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, U.S. HEALTH 
CARE FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: SPENDING, USE OF SERVICES, PRICES, AND HEALTH IN 13 
COUNTRIES 2–5 (2015), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/201 
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many more people have gained insurance coverage and the financial 
protection that comes with it.12 Increasingly, however, insurance coverage 
does not ensure financial protection for patients.13 With the election of 
Donald Trump as president, the future of the coverage gains under the 
ACA is uncertain at best.14 
There is a great cost shift underway in American health care.15 The 
costs of health care are rising, and the patient is picking up a larger portion 
through out-of-pocket cost-sharing.16 The financial protection afforded by 
insurance coverage, even the historically robust coverage provided by 
employers, is eroding. Although premium growth has moderated, 
deductibles, which are the amounts patients must pay out-of-pocket before 
 
 
5/oct/1819_squires_us_hlt_care_global_perspective_oecd_intl_brief_v3.pdf; Daniel A. Austin, 
Medical Debt as a Cause of Consumer Bankruptcy, 67 ME. L. REV. 1, 7–13 (2014); Melissa B. Jacoby 
& Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. 
& ETHICS 239, 245–248 (2010). See also, Max Blau, In the State with the Highest Medical Debt, It’s 
the Middle Class Who Carries the Burden, STATNEWS.COM (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.statnews. 
com/2017/03/24/mississippi-medical-debt-middle-class/. 
 12.  Rachel Garfield & Katherine Young, How Does Gaining Coverage Affect People’s Lives? 
Access, Utilization, and Financial Security Among Newly Insured Adults, 1–2, 14–16 KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (June 19, 2015), http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/how-does-gaining-coverage-affect-
peoples-lives-access-utilization-and-financial-security-among-newly-insured-adults/. 
 13.  See, e.g., Margot Sanger-Katz, Why Insurance Doesn’t Always Prevent Giant Medical Bills, 
N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (May 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/upshot/why-
insurance-doesnt-always-prevent-giant-medical-bills.html. 
 14.  See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha & Amy Goldstein, The Ultimate Q&A About Health Care 
Under a Trump Presidency, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/to-your-health/wp/2016/11/17/the-ultimate-qa-about-health-care-under-president-trump/?ut 
m_term=.f8573b70d011; Timothy Jost, Day One and Beyond: What Trump’s Election Means for the 
ACA, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 9, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/11/09/day-one-and-
beyond-what-trumps-election-means-for-the-aca/.  
 15.  Topher Spiro, Maura Calsyn & Meghan O’Toole, The Great Cost Shift: Why Middle-Class 
Workers Do Not Feel the Health Care Spending Slowdown, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 3, 2015, 
12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2015/03/03/105777/the-great-
cost-shift/. 
 16.  For example, the average hospitalization costs a patient with insurance $1013 out-of-pocket, 
up 37% from $738 in 2009. Emily R. Adrion et al., Out-of-Pocket Spending for Hospitalizations 
Among Nonelderly Adults, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1325, 1327 (2016). It is worth noting that out-
of-pocket spending has steadied or declined based on the ACA’s coverage expansion, but it can still be 
true that many see their out-of-pocket costs rising. This may be because now more people have 
relatively high out-of-pocket costs, but fewer have astronomical costs. See SHERRY GLIED ET AL., THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, REALIZING HEALTH REFORM’S POTENTIAL: HOW THE ACA’S HEALTH 
INSURANCE EXPANSIONS HAVE AFFECTED OUT-OF-POCKET COST-SHARING AND SPENDING ON 
PREMIUMS (2016), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2016/ 
sep/1899_glied_aca_hlt_ins_expansions_oop_spending_rb_v2.pdf.   
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insurance kicks in, have been rising much faster than wages or inflation.17 
Deductibles have more than tripled in the past decade from $303 on 
average in 2006 to $1221 in 2016.18 A growing proportion of workers 
have high deductible health plans, increasing from just 4% in 2006 to 29% 
in 2016.19 Nearly 99% of individuals with coverage from an ACA 
exchange had a high deductible plan.20  
Although some may blame the ACA for rising out-of-pocket costs, 
these trends were under way before 2010 and will likely persist regardless 
of the ACA’s future,21 particularly under Republican proposals to repeal 
and replace the ACA.22 This cost shift to individuals is particularly 
burdensome for lower-income consumers who are unable to afford their 
health care costs and are finding themselves increasingly underinsured.23 
 
 
 17.  Employer Family Health Premiums Rise 4 Percent to $17,545 in 2015, Extending a 
Decade-Long Trend of Relatively Moderate Increases, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 22, 2015), 
http://kff.org/health-costs/press-release/employer-family-health-premiums-rise-4-percent-to-17545-in-
2015-extending-a-decade-long-trend-of-relatively-moderate-increases/.  
 18.  GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TR., 
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2016 ANNUAL SURVEY 129 exhibit 7.9 (2016), http://files.kff.org/ 
attachment/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-2016-Annual-Survey.  
 19.  Id. at 160 exhibit 8.5.  
 20.  Health Policy Brief: High Deductible Health Plans, HEALTH AFF. 1 (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_152.pdf. High-deductible health 
plans are defined as plans with an annual individual deductible of $1300 or a family deductible of 
$2600 in 2017. Rev. Proc. 2016-28, 2016-20 I.R.B. 852.  
 21.  See Rachel Dolan, From the Archives: Deductibles and Out-of-Pocket Costs, HEALTH AFF. 
BLOG (Sept. 29, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/09/29/from-the-archives-deductibles-and-
out-of-pocket-costs/.  
 22.  As passed by the House of Representatives on May 4, 2017, the Republicans’ 2017 bill to 
repeal and replace the ACA, titled the “American Health Care Act” (AHCA) would substantially 
increase out-of-pockets health care costs. CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 1628 
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE ACT 7, 20 (May 24, 2017). Economists have estimated that an earlier 
version of the AHCA would increase cost-sharing significantly, raising total annual costs (including 
premiums and cost-sharing) for individuals by $1542 immediately and $2409 by 2020. For families, 
the cost increases would have been $2243 immediately and $4274 by 2020. David Cutler et al., 
Analysis: GOP Plan to Cost Obamacare Enrollees $1,542 More a Year, VOX (Mar. 7, 2017, 1:00 
PM), http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/3/7/14843632/aca-republican-health-care-plan-premiums 
-cost-price.  A separate analysis estimated that the AHCA would increase Americans’ out-of-pocket 
costs (deductibles, copays, and co-insurance) by $33 billion by 2026. JOSH BIVENS, ECON. POLICY 
INST., THE $33 BILLION HIDDEN TAX IN THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE ACT—HIGHER DEDUCTIBLES 
AND COPAYS 1–2 (2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/124460.pdf.  
 23.  Under the Commonwealth Fund’s three-part definition of underinsurance, a person is 
underinsured if: “[1] out-of-pocket costs, excluding premiums, over the prior 12 months are equal to 
10 percent or more of household income; [2] out-of-pocket costs, excluding premiums, are equal to 5 
percent or more of household income if income is under 200 percent of the federal poverty level 
($22,980 for an individual and $47,100 for a family of four); or [3] the deductible is 5 percent or more 
of household income.” In 2014, 23% of all adults aged nineteen to sixty-four in the United States, or 
about thirty-one million people, were underinsured. SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH 
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Medical bill-related financial distress was improved but not entirely solved 
by the expansion of coverage under the ACA due to rising out-of-pocket 
expenses.24   
The increasing out-of-pocket burden on patients is exacerbated by a 
related trend of narrowing networks of providers participating in the 
patient’s health insurance plan.25 The ACA prohibits health plans from 
using traditional insurance underwriting practices to reduce health care 
spending through risk selection (e.g., avoiding bad risks and cherry-
picking good risks).26 As such, narrow networks have become the primary 
strategy for health insurers to keep health care premiums from ballooning, 
by contracting with a limited network of providers who agree to lower fees 
in exchange for a higher volume of patients.27  
Narrow networks are correlated with lower health plan premiums,28 but 
the increasing use of narrow networks means the patient is more likely to 
inadvertently find herself out-of-network. Health plan design typically 
gives patients significant financial incentives to receive health care within 
the network and, if it is covered at all, financial penalties for straying 
outside the network in the form of higher co-payments, co-insurance, and 
a separate, higher out-of-network deductible.29 
This article’s objective is to evaluate the existence and strength of 
financial protections for health care consumers. Despite consumers’ sense 
 
 
FUND, THE PROBLEM OF UNDERINSURANCE AND HOW RISING DEDUCTIBLES WILL MAKE IT WORSE: 
FINDINGS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH FUND BIENNIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SURVEY, 2014 (2015), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2015/may/1817_collins_pro 
blem_of_underinsurance_ib.pdf.  
 24.  See Reed Abelson, More Insured, but the Choices Are Narrowing, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 
2014, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/business/more-insured-but-the-choices-are-
narrowing.html. 
 25.  See MARK A. HALL ET AL., THE SCHAEFFER INITIATIVE FOR INNOVATION IN HEALTH 
POLICY, SOLVING SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS 12 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/ 
uploads/2016/10/sbb1.pdf; DAN POLSKY & JANET WEINER, LEONARD DAVIS INST. OF HEALTH ECON., 
THE SKINNY ON NARROW NETWORKS IN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE PLANS 3 (2015), 
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2015/rwjf421027. 
 26.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012) 
(establishing limits on health plan underwriting on the basis of health status); PPACA § 1302, 42 
U.S.C. § 18022 (2012) (establishing requirements for health plans to cover the essential health 
benefits). 
 27.  See David Cusano & Amy Thomas, Narrow Networks Under the ACA: Financial Drivers 
and Implementation Strategies, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 17, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/ 
2014/02/17/narrow-networks-under-the-aca-financial-drivers-and-implementation-strategies/. 
 28.  Daniel Polsky et al., Marketplace Plans with Narrow Physician Networks Feature Lower 
Monthly Premiums Than Plans with Larger Networks, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1842, 1845 (2016). 
 29.  HALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 7–8.  
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that there are few legal protections against medical bill-related financial 
distress, there is a growing body of financial protections under federal and 
state law for health care consumers. The ACA contains a handful of 
consumer financial protections, including limits on cost-sharing and 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules limiting the worst billing and 
collection practices of tax-exempt hospitals.30 Some of these rules will 
likely remain in place even if the GOP passes a bill to repeal and replace 
the ACA.31 The ACA’s annual limit on consumers’ out-of-pocket 
spending, however, is threatened.32 Other federal efforts to make Medicare 
payments “site-neutral” and the work of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) on credit reporting of medical debts have 
created significant protections for health care consumers across the 
country.33 It is the states, however, that have led the way with an array of 
legal innovations to address consumer protections in health care—
particularly in the area of surprise medical bills but also in limits to 
medical debt collection practices.34 Thus, the optimistic view contends that 
there are significant policy efforts at the state and federal levels to give 
 
 
 30.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19a(b) (2012) (limiting cost-sharing for out-of-network emergency 
services); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719A(b) (2016) (implementing § 300gg-19a for Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) group health plans); 45 C.F.R. § 147.138(b) (2016) 
(implementing the same for group and individual health insurance markets); 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(1) 
(2012); 45 C.F.R. §156.130 (2016) (capping annual out-of-pocket costs); 26 U.S.C. § 501(r) (2012) 
(imposing limits on tax-exempt hospitals’ billing and collection practices). For a discussion of the 
ACA’s limits on cost-sharing, see infra Part I.A.1. For a discussion of these rules for tax-exempt 
hospitals, see infra Part I.C.1.  
 31.  The technical reason is that the GOP is trying to pass its ACA repeal bill through budget 
reconciliation to avoid the possibility of a Senate filibuster. According to Senate rules, reconciliation 
bills can only contain provisions that directly affect the federal budget (e.g., taxing and spending 
provisions), and thus many of the ACA consumer protections discussed in this article are not directly 
altered through the ACA repeal bill. See Timothy Jost, Examining the House Republican ACA Repeal 
and Replace Legislation, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 7, 2017), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/ 
2017/03/07/examining-the-house-republican-aca-repeal-and-replace-legislation/. Nevertheless, the 
AHCA would significantly increase out-of-pocket costs, increase cost-sharing, and substantially 
increase premiums for older and sicker individuals. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 22.  
 32.  The version of the AHCA that passed the House on May 4, 2017, contains changes that 
could erode the ACA’s caps on annual out-of-pocket costs for many, including those covered by 
employer-sponsored plans. See Stephanie Armour & Michelle Hackman, GOP Health Bill Jeopardizes 
Out-of-Pocket Caps in Employer Plans, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2017, 2:54 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/little-noted-provision-of-gop-health-bill-could-alter-employer-plans-149 
3890203; Matthew Fiedler, New Changes to Essential Benefits in GOP Health Bill Could Jeopardize 
Protections against Catastrophic Costs, Even for People with Job-Based Coverage, BROOKINGS (May 
4, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/03/24/new-changes-to-essential-benefits-in-
gop-health-bill-could-jeopardize-protections-against-catastrophic-costs-even-for-people-with-job-
based-coverage/. 
 33.  See infra Part I.C.3.  
 34.  See infra Parts I.A.3 and I.C.2. 
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consumers meaningful protections from medical bill-related financial 
distress.  
The dimmer view is that the significant state innovation in this area is 
insufficient, in part because of substantive gaps in these policies’ 
protections and also because of structural limits of state regulation.35 For 
the substantive gaps, this article sets forth a model set of policy reforms 
that build upon recent state legislation to protect health care consumers, 
including presumptively binding health care price estimates, regulatory 
caps on out-of-network rates, elimination of unwarranted facility fees for 
state and private payers, and private remedies under state unfair trade 
practice laws.36  
More nettlesome are the structural limits of state consumer financial 
protections—even the most comprehensive state innovations cannot reach 
the growing number of privately insured individuals with employer-based 
coverage because of the sweeping preemptive effect of ERISA.37 Despite 
beneficial state innovation and leadership in the area of patient financial 
protection, a growing ERISA black hole means a federal solution is 
necessary to extend protections to all health care consumers. The federal 
solution could include amending ERISA to exempt state health care 
consumer protections from preemption or regulatory actions to establish 
federal standards that protect all health care consumers.38  
This article analyzes and proposes concrete policy approaches to 
address the range of harmful financial practices targeting health care 
consumers. Part I describes three types of harmful medical-billing 
practices: (1) surprise medical bills from involuntary out-of-network care, 
(2) price opacity and added facility fees for outpatient services, and (3) the 
medical debt collection and credit reporting actions that follow from 
unpaid medical bills. Part I goes on to catalogue the range of federal and 
state policy responses to each of these forms of health care consumer 
distress. Part II identifies the substantive gaps in existing law and imagines 
which model policies could provide the types of consumer financial 
protections needed to fill these gaps. Part III explains how ERISA creates 
a significant structural barrier limiting the reach of state-led policies for 
health care consumer protection, underscoring the need for a federal 
response and suggesting a few forms such a federal solution could take.  
 
 
 35.  For a discussion of the substantive gaps, see infra Parts I.A.4, I.B.3, and I.C.4. 
 36.  See infra Part II.  
 37.  See infra Part III.  
 38.  See infra Part III.B.  
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I. TYPES OF HEALTH CARE CONSUMER FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND POLICY 
RESPONSES 
Health care consumers’ financial distress is driven by an inability to 
pay for needed health care.39 The purpose of health insurance is to shield 
the consumer from the financial risks of health care consumption,40 which 
tends to be both unpredictable and extremely expensive. Notwithstanding 
rising rates of insurance coverage, several medical billing practices are 
leading to higher, unavoidable, and unanticipated out-of-pockets costs for 
patients. First is the phenomenon of surprise medical bills for involuntary 
and unanticipated out-of-network services. Second is the peculiar way we 
shop and pay for medical care—blind, à la carte, and confusingly 
complicated, which allows for billing practices such as added facility fees 
that are often the byproduct of increasing corporate consolidation in health 
care. And finally, there are the consumer’s financial ramifications from 
unpaid medical bills ranging from damaged credit to aggressive debt 
collection practices.  
Federal and state policymakers have begun to respond to the array of 
medical billing and collection practices that financially harm patients. For 
each type of harmful medical billing practice, this Part analyzes the policy 
responses to protect patients as consumers initiated by the federal 
government and by states. Although these policies are numerous, when 
taken together, most consumers in the country remain largely unprotected.  
A. Surprise Medical Bills 
One of the most prominent examples of health care consumer harm is 
the surprise medical bill. A surprise medical bill is defined as charges that 
arise when an insured patient inadvertently receives care from an out-of-
network provider.41 Surprise medical bills typically occur in two 
situations. First, a patient may receive emergency care from an out-of-
network provider (whether a hospital, an emergency physician, or 
emergency medical transportation) because the patient cannot choose an 
 
 
 39.  In a feedback loop mechanism, health-related financial distress itself can have negative 
effects on a person’s physical health, which has been documented in particular for those with 
expensive, long-term cancer diagnoses. Isaac D. Buck, The Cost of High Prices: Embedding an Ethic 
of Expense into the Standard of Care, 58 B.C. L. REV. 101, 136–38 (2017).   
 40.  Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care Spending and Financial Security After the Affordable 
Care Act, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1482 (2014).  
 41.  Karen Pollitz, Surprise Medical Bills, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 17, 2016), http://kff.org/ 
private-insurance/issue-brief/surprise-medical-bills/ (using this definition of surprise medical bill).  
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in-network provider due to the emergency.42 Second, a patient may 
inadvertently receive care from an out-of-network provider at an in-
network facility (e.g., the hospital is in-network, but the anesthesiologist 
or radiologist is out-of-network).43 Thus, the three common characteristics 
of a surprise medical bill are that it is unanticipated, involuntary, and out-
of-network.  
Although precise calculations of the magnitude of surprise medical 
billing are lacking, a national survey by Kelly Kyanko, Leslie Curry, and 
Susan Busch reported that about 40% of individuals who used out-of-
network services did so involuntarily, amounting to approximately three 
million people annually.44 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) economists 
Christopher Garmon and Benjamin Chartock calculated that in 2014, 
among patients with employer-sponsored insurance, “20% of hospital 
inpatient admissions that originated in the emergency department (ED), 
14% of outpatient visits to the ED, and 9% of elective inpatient admissions 
likely led to a surprise medical bill.”45 A 2016 New York Times and 
Kaiser Family Foundation survey found that about 22% of insured adults 
between eighteen and sixty-four who had problems paying their medical 
bills had received a surprise bill in the previous year.46 In just the 
emergency context, Zack Cooper and Fiona Scott Morton similarly found 
22% of visits to in-network emergency departments involved out-of-
 
 
 42.  See Olga Khazan, Don’t Pay That Medical Bill, ATLANTIC, Aug. 20, 2015, available at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/08/dont-pay-that-medical-bill/401726/ (quoting 
Susan Rosalsky, who received a $32,845 balance bill after her husband underwent emergency heart 
surgery: “Mike's life was in jeopardy . . . . There was little time to think rationally. It would never have 
occurred to us to ask every individual, ‘Are you in my network?’”).  
 43.  Kelly A. Kyanko et al., Out-of-Network Physicians: How Prevalent Are Involuntary Use 
and Cost Transparency?, 48 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1154, 1154 (2013). 
 44.  Id. at 1160, 1166 (estimating that 8% of privately insured individuals used out-of-network 
care in 2011, and 40% of those claims were involuntary, resulting in surprise medical bills). 
 45.  Christopher Garmon & Benjamin Chartock, One in Five Inpatient Emergency Department 
Cases May Lead to Surprise Bills, 36 HEALTH AFF. 177, 177, 179 (2017). Because narrow networks 
are more common in exchange plans than in employer-sponsored plans, the numbers may 
underestimate the actual prevalence of surprise bills across the entire insured population. Id. at 180. 
 46.  LIZ HAMEL ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE BURDEN OF MEDICAL DEBT: RESULTS 
FROM THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION/NEW YORK TIMES MEDICAL BILLS SURVEY 12 (2016), 
http://kff.org/report-section/the-burden-of-medical-debt-introduction/. The survey calculated that 32% 
of insured adults aged eighteen to sixty-four who reported having problems paying medical bills 
received care out-of-network, and 69% of them were unaware that the provider was out-of-network 
when they received the care. Thus, the percentage of responders who reported receiving out-of-
network care that was a surprise is 22% (32% * 69% = 22%). Id.  
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network physicians over a twenty-month period.47  
The financial impact of surprise medical bills goes beyond the fact that 
the bill was unanticipated. Out-of-network charges are often substantially 
higher than in-network rates, and the patient bears much more of the cost 
because of higher cost-sharing obligations for out-of-network care and 
balance-billing.48 When a patient receives care from an out-of-network 
provider, there are no negotiated rates with her insurance plan, so the 
provider typically charges full, undiscounted charges.49 Even when a 
health plan covers a portion of an out-of-network charge, the patient is 
generally required to pay higher cost-sharing amounts for out-of-network 
care50 and then receives a bill for the difference between provider’s full 
charge and the amount paid by the plan, a practice called balance-billing.51 
Balance-billing obligations are uncapped, because they typically do not 
count toward the patient’s deductible or the out-of-pocket limits under the 
plan.52  
The individual financial impact becomes apparent through concrete 
examples. Aetna’s website calculates the difference between a consumer’s 
in-network versus out-of-network bill for an $825 physician’s charge. If 
the physician is in-network, the patient would pay only $140, but if the 
physician was out-of-network, the patient would pay $645 due to 
additional co-insurance, higher out-of-network deductible, and balance-
billing.53 A study of larger balance bills by New York’s Department of 
 
 
 47.  Zack Cooper & Fiona Scott Morton, Out-of-Network Emergency-Physician Bills—An 
Unwelcome Surprise, 375 N. ENG. J. MED. 1915, 1916 (2016).  
 48.  Id. at 1917 (estimating that out-of-network emergency physicians charged an average of 
798% of the Medicare rate versus 297% of Medicare rates charged by in-network physicians, and that 
the average balance bill was $622.55).  
 49.  See Gerard Anderson, From ‘Soak the Rich’ To ‘Soak the Poor’: Recent Trends in Hospital 
Pricing, 26 HEALTH AFF. 780, 781 (2007).  
 50.  HALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 7–8. 
 51.  See Carol K. Lucas & Michelle A. Williams, The Rights of Nonparticipating Providers in a 
Managed Care World: Navigating the Minefields of Balance Billing and Reasonable and Customary 
Payments, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 132, 147 (2009) (“The term ‘balance billing’ refers to the 
practice of out-of-network medical providers billing a patient the difference between the 
reimbursement made by an enrollee’s health plan and the amount the provider contends it is owed for 
the services rendered.”). Hospitals are usually prohibited (by contract or state law) from balance-
billing patients whose insurance plans have a contract with the hospital and must accept the insurance 
plan’s payment as payment in full. Id. at 147–48.  
 52.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(3)(B) (2012) (excluding “balance billing amounts” from cost-
sharing); see also Network and Out of Network Care, AETNA.COM, http://www.aetna.com/individuals-
families/member-rights-resources/claims-coverage/out-of-network-doctor-costs.html (last visited April 
10, 2017) (“What you pay when you are balance billed does not count toward your deductible. And it 
is not part of any cap your plan has on how much you have to pay for covered services.”). 
 53.  Network and Out of Network Care, supra note 52.  
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Financial Services found that in 2011 the average out-of-network 
emergency bill was $7006, with the consumer paying $3778, or 54% of 
the bill.54 
The rise of surprise medical billing is driven in part by the increasing 
use by health insurance plans of narrow networks as a strategy to keep 
premiums affordable.55 Narrow networks make it more likely that a patient 
will find herself inadvertently receiving care from an out-of-network 
provider in an emergency or even at an in-network facility.56 In addition, 
the lack of disclosure or network transparency makes it difficult or 
impossible for a patient to avoid out-of-network providers even if the 
patient assiduously chooses an in-network facility.57 In Texas, for 
example, the share of in-network hospitals with no in-network emergency 
physicians ranged from twenty-one to 56% for the three largest health 
insurers.58 Having no in-network emergency physicians all but guarantees 
that a patient will receive a surprise medical bill from an out-of-network 
emergency physician even if she goes to an in-network emergency room.59 
The problem is not limited to Texas or emergency departments. A study of 
health plans offered on federal exchanges across thirty-four states found 
 
 
 54.  N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., AN UNWELCOME SURPRISE: HOW NEW YORKERS ARE 
GETTING STUCK WITH UNEXPECTED MEDICAL BILLS FROM OUT-OF-NETWORK PROVIDERS 18, 19 
(2012), http://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/archive/assets/documents/DFS%20Re 
port.pdf (defining “larger” balance bills as bills for emergency services exceeding $2500 and more 
than 200% of Medicare’s rate for emergency services in 2010). Similarly, average out-of-network 
charges for radiology were $5406 (thirty-three times what Medicare would pay) for which the average 
patient’s share of the bill was $2910. The average out-of-network charges for assistant surgeons was 
$13,914, or twenty-one times what Medicare would pay. Id.  
 55.  See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. See Abelson, supra note 24. 
 56.  According to a Kaiser Family Foundation survey, nearly 60% of individuals did not know 
that doctors at in-network hospitals are not always in-network as well. Mira Norton et al., Assessing 
Americans’ Familiarity with Health Insurance Terms and Concepts, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 11, 
2014), http://kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/assessing-americans-familiarity-with-health-insurance-
terms-and-concepts/.  
 57.  See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., supra note 54, at 13 (reporting many consumer 
complaints due to lack of disclosure over the out-of-network status of health care providers); see also 
Cooper & Scott Morton, supra note 47, at 1916 (calculating that 99.35% of all emergency room visits 
occurred at in-network facilities).  
 58.  STACEY POGUE & MEGAN RANDALL, SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF 
TEXANS: LITTLE-KNOWN PRACTICE CREATES A “SECOND EMERGENCY” FOR ER PATIENTS, CTR. FOR 
PUB. POL’Y PRIORITIES 3 (Sept. 15, 2014), http://forabettertexas.org/images/HC_2014_09_PP_ 
BalanceBilling.pdf. The reported percentage of in-network hospital emergency rooms with no in-
network emergency physicians are 21% for Blue Cross Blue Shield, 45% for United Healthcare, and 
56% for Humana. Id. 8% of hospitals in Texas (twenty-three of 276) that contract with all three of the 
largest insurers have no in-network emergency physicians. Id. at 4.  
 59.  Id. at 4.  
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that nearly 15% of plans had no in-network physicians in at least one 
specialty.60    
Public outcry against surprise medical bills has started to drive 
legislation and policies to prevent or limit their occurrence. Moreover, 
existing tools of insurance regulation—limiting patients’ cost-sharing 
obligations and ensuring adequate access to in-network providers—
provide additional protections against excess financial burdens from out-
of-network care. Three main policies are explored below: (1) federal 
protections limiting patient’s out-of-pocket cost-sharing in the ACA, (2) 
regulation of network adequacy and provider network accuracy, and (3) 
laws limiting surprise medical bills.  
1. ACA Limits on Cost-Sharing 
Specific provisions in the ACA aim to protect patients against 
uncapped financial exposure due to out-of-pocket spending, including 
limits on patients’ cost-sharing for out-of-network emergency care and 
caps on out-of-pocket spending. The ACA as a whole, including these 
particular provisions, continues to govern while the Republican-controlled 
Congress and President Trump advance efforts to “repeal and replace” the 
ACA.61 Even if the insurance and coverage landscape changes 
dramatically in coming months or years, the ACA’s requirements and the 
effects of these rules on individuals’ out-of-pocket exposure provide an 
important baseline from which changes and trends can be measured, 
illustrating tangibly how changes in policy can affect individuals’ welfare.  
The drafters of the ACA understood that in an emergency, a patient 
may be unable to choose an in-network provider, which can be extremely 
costly to patients if their health plans do not cover out-of-network 
emergency services. The ACA thus requires that all non-grandfathered 
health plans cover out-of-network emergency care and limit patients’ cost-
sharing amount to the amount they would owe if they received the 
emergency care in-network.62 Health plans must pay for out-of-network 
 
 
 60.  Stephen C. Dorner et al., Adequacy of Outpatient Specialty Care Access in Marketplace 
Plans Under the Affordable Care Act, 314 JAMA 1749, 1749–50 (2015). 
 61.  For purposes of this discussion, one notable change in the bill that passed the House of 
Representatives would potentially eliminate annual limits on consumers’ out-of-pocket costs. See 
Armour & Hackman, supra note 32; infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 62.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19a(b) (2012); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719A(b) (2016) 
(implementing § 300gg-19a for ERISA group health plans); Patient Protections 45 C.F.R. § 147.138(b) 
(2016) (implementing the same for group and individual health insurance markets).   
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emergency services according to one of three formulations.63 In practice, 
this means that health plans typically pay an amount known as the “usual, 
customary, and reasonable” (UCR) charges for the service, which is an 
amount that is typically higher than the provider’s in-network rates, but 
lower than full charges.64 But patients may still face higher costs for out-
of-network emergency care because: (1) the cost-sharing limits only apply 
to co-payments and co-insurance, so out-of-network emergency services 
may be charged to a separate, higher out-of-network deductible65 and (2) 
the requirements do not prevent the out-of-network provider from balance-
billing the patient for the difference between the amount paid by the plan 
and the provider’s full charges.66 If a state prohibits balance-billing, then 
health plans do not need to comply with the minimum payment 
requirement at all.67  
Thus, the ACA’s requirements for out-of-network emergency care fail 
to protect patients from the largest out-of-network expense—balance-
billing. And ironically, the requirement that health plans must pay for out-
of-network emergency services may also increase providers’ incentives to 
 
 
 63.  29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719A(b)(3) (2016); 45 C.F.R. § 147.138(b)(3) (2016) (providing 
that non-grandfathered health plans shall pay for out-of-network emergency services in an amount 
equal to the greatest of: (1) the amount negotiated with in-network providers for the emergency service 
furnished; (2) the amount for the emergency service calculated using the same method the plan 
generally uses to determine payments for out-of-network services (such as the usual, customary, and 
reasonable charges), but substituting the in-network cost-sharing provisions for the out-of-network 
cost-sharing provisions; or (3) the amount that would be paid under Medicare for the emergency 
service).   
 64.  See Lucas & Williams, supra note 51, at 138 (describing UCR as “a concept that generally 
embodies payment of an amount that a health plan determines is usual for a particular procedure, 
charged by a majority of physicians with similar training and experience within the same geographic 
area”).  
 65.  See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719A(b)(3) (2016); 45 C.F.R. § 147.138(b)(3)(ii) (2016) (“Any 
cost-sharing requirement other than a copayment or coinsurance requirement (such as a deductible or 
out-of-pocket maximum) may be imposed with respect to emergency services provided out-of-network 
if the cost-sharing requirement generally applies to out-of-network benefits. A deductible may be 
imposed with respect to out-of-network emergency services only as part of a deductible that generally 
applies to out-of-network benefits. If an out-of-pocket maximum generally applies to out-of-network 
benefits, that out-of-pocket maximum must apply to out-of-network emergency services.”); see also 45 
C.F.R. § 147.138(b)(3)(iv) ex. 6 (2016). 
 66.  29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719A(b)(3)(i) (2016); 45 C.F.R. § 147.138(b)(3)(i) (2016) 
(providing “a participant, beneficiary, or enrollee may be required to pay, in addition to the in-network 
cost-sharing, the excess of the amount the out-of-network provider charges over the amount the plan or 
issuer is required to pay under this paragraph (b)(3)(i)”). 
 67.  45 C.F.R. § 147.138(b)(3)(iii) (2016); Affordable Care Act Implementation FAQs – Set 1, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-
FAQs/aca_implementation_faqs.html (“If a State law prohibits balance billing, plans and issuers are 
not required to satisfy the payment minimums set forth in the regulations.”).  
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remain out-of-network, because health plans must pay for the services, 
usually at a higher rate than they would receive if they agreed to be in-
network.68  
A separate provision of the ACA extends additional protection to 
patients by capping the amount of cost-sharing patients and families can 
be expected to pay. The ACA limits the amount of annual out-of-pocket 
spending on co-insurance, co-payments, and deductibles to $7150 for 
individuals and $14,300 for families in 2017.69 After an individual or 
family reaches the limit, the health plan must cover 100% of additional 
covered health care costs for the rest of the year.70 Significantly, however, 
these limits do not apply to premiums or to out-of-network services, 
including cost-sharing or balance bills for out-of-network services.71 
Because the ACA expressly excludes out-of-network balance bills from 
the definition of “cost-sharing,” HHS cannot, by regulatory interpretation, 
extend the limits on cost-sharing to surprise medical bills without 
additional legislation from (an unwilling) Congress.72  
The House-approved ACA-repeal bill threatens to obviate the ACA’s 
annual limits on out-of-pocket caps. The AHCA would allow states to 
obtain waivers from the ACA’s insurance requirements, including how to 
define the “essential health benefits” that must be covered by all plans.73 
 
 
 68.  HALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 18.  
 69.  42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(1) (2012); 45 C.F.R. §156.130 (2016). See Out-of-Pocket 
Maximum/Limit, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/out-of-pocket-maximum-
limit/ (last visited May 19, 2017). The cost-sharing limit is adjusted annually according to a statutory 
formula. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(1) (2012). This out-of-pocket maximum applies to all non-
grandfathered health plans, including plans sold on the exchanges, individual plans, group plans, and 
self-insured plans. See FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation (Part XXVII), DEP’T OF LAB. 
(May 26, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-
center/faqs/aca-part-xxvii.pdf.  
 70.  See HEALTHCARE.GOV, supra note 69.  
 71.  42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(3) (2012) (“[C]ost-sharing” excludes “premiums, balance billing 
amounts for non-network providers, or spending for non-covered services.”); 45 C.F.R. § 156.130(c) 
(“In the case of a plan using a network of providers, cost sharing paid by, or on behalf of, an enrollee 
for benefits provided outside of such network is not required to count toward the annual limitation on 
cost sharing”). The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) clarified that health plans may, 
at their option, count out-of-network cost-sharing toward the annual limit on cost-sharing, but they are 
not required to do so. Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10750, 10824 
(Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Feb. 27, 2015) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 156.130(c) (2016)).  
 72.  42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(3) (2012). See infra notes 133–37 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of a federal rule that counts surprise out-of-network cost-sharing (but not balance-billing) 
toward in-network cost-sharing limits for “qualified health plans” sold on ACA exchanges. 
 73.  American Health Care Act, H.R. 1628, § 136(b) 115th Cong. (2017). This provision of the 
AHCA allowing redefinition of essential health benefits is known as the “MacArthur Amendment” 
after proponent Representative Tom MacArthur (R-NJ). See Timothy Jost, The MacArthur Amendment 
Language, Race in the Federal Exchange, and Risk Adjustment Coefficients, HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION IN HEALTH CARE 143 
 
 
 
 
The ACA’s annual cap on out-of-pocket costs is required of nearly all 
plans, including employer-sponsored plans, but the cap only applies to 
spending on “essential health benefits.”74 Thus, if states dramatically pare 
back the essential health benefits (for example, by eliminating prescription 
drug coverage or maternity coverage), it would dramatically limit how 
much of a patient’s health care costs would be subject to an annual limit 
on out-of-pocket spending.75  
Although these provisions were in the version of the ACA repeal bill 
that passed the House, it is likely the bill will change significantly in the 
Senate. It is also possible that Senate rules for budget reconciliation, under 
which the ACA repeal effort proceeds, will not permit alteration of these 
provisions (i.e., limiting out-of-pocket caps via changes to the essential 
health benefits) because they do not produce a change to budget outlays or 
revenues.76 If provisions do not directly affect the federal budget, they 
must be addressed in separate legislation requiring bipartisan support due 
to the legislative filibuster.77  
In sum, the ACA’s out-of-pocket limits shield many people from 
catastrophic medical bills but only where all the treatment is received in-
network. The ACA’s cost-sharing limits are less helpful to those with 
recurring medical expenses or out-of-network bills.78 The future of the 
ACA’s protections against uncapped out-of-pocket expenses may be 
threatened by efforts to repeal and replace the ACA. 
 
 
 
 
 
(April 25, 2017), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/04/25/the-macarthur-amendment-language-race-in-
the-federal-exchange-and-risk-adjustment-coefficients/.  
 74.  Armour & Hackman, supra note 32; Fiedler, supra note 32. 
 75.  Fiedler, supra note 32. Employer-sponsored plans may be free to choose which state’s 
definition of “essential health benefits” it wants to use, which may lead them to choose the narrowest 
definition of required benefits to reduce costs. Id.  
 76.  American Health Care Act, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017). 2 U.S.C. §§ 641(d); 644(b). See 
BILL HENIFF JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL30862, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS: THE 
SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 5 (2010); see also Jost, supra note 31. 
 77.  See, e.g., Jim Newell, Half Measures: Why Is the GOP Trying to Do Some of Its Favored 
Health Care Reform Changes and Not Others?, SLATE (Mar. 13, 2017, 12:38 PM), http://www.slate. 
com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/03/the_most_confusing_part_of_the_trumpcare_bill.htm
l. See also supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
 78.  See, e.g., Jayne O’Donnell & Laura Ungar, Obamacare Reduces Maximum Out-of-Pocket 
Costs, but Not Enough for Some, USA TODAY (Aug. 3, 2015, 6:02 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/money/personalfinance/2015/08/03/how-pay-high-out--pocket-costs/30696993/.  
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2. Network Adequacy/Provider Directories 
Surprise medical bills and out-of-network costs have risen as provider 
networks have narrowed.79 One widespread policy response has been to 
use insurance regulation to strengthen network adequacy requirements. 
Network adequacy refers to a health plan’s ability to provide enrollees 
with timely and reasonable access to a sufficient number of in-network 
primary care and specialty physicians and other health care services 
included under the terms of the contract.80  
a. Federal Network Adequacy Requirements 
The ACA requires all qualified health plans participating in the 
exchanges to meet network adequacy standards.81 The ACA’s network 
adequacy standards provide that exchange plans must maintain “a network 
that is sufficient in number and types of providers” such that “all services 
will be accessible without unreasonable delay,” and requires them to 
disclose their provider directories to the marketplace for online 
publication.82  
b. State Network Adequacy Requirements 
Despite the ACA’s federal network adequacy standard for exchange 
plans, states have traditionally assumed the task of defining network 
adequacy as part of their role as primary regulators of insurance.83 
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, twenty-eight 
states and the District of Columbia have passed their own network 
 
 
 79.  See HALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 12–13.  
 80.  See, e.g., Ashley Noble, Insurance Carriers and Access to Health Care Providers: Network 
Adequacy, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/ 
insurance-carriers-and-access-to-healthcare-providers-network-adequacy.aspx.  
 81.  42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(1)(B) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(a) (2016).  
 82.  45 C.F.R. § 156.230(a)(2) (2016). In 2015, CMS had proposed a rule to require quantitative 
time and distance standards for network adequacy requirements for exchange plans. HHS Notice of 
Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 75488, 75549-75552 (Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs. proposed Dec. 2, 2015). In the final rule, however, CMS declined to promulgate these 
specific federal network adequacy requirements to give states time to adopt the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Model Act (discussed infra notes 88–93 accompanying text). 81 
Fed. Reg. 12204, 12301-12307 (Mar. 8, 2016). 
 83.  See JUSTIN GIOVANELLI ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: STATE REGULATION OF MARKETPLACE PLAN PROVIDER NETWORKS 1 
(2015), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2015/may/1814_gio 
vannelli_implementing_aca_state_reg_provider_networks_rb_v2.pdf.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION IN HEALTH CARE 145 
 
 
 
 
adequacy standards.84 These vary in terms of specificity—some impose 
quantitative requirements such as providing sufficient numbers of in-
network providers that an enrollee can access within a certain driving 
distance or time (e.g., thirty miles or thirty minutes’ drive), while others 
use minimum waiting times to see a provider or minimum ratios of 
providers to enrollees.85 Others states’ requirements are worded more 
generally, similar to the ACA’s network adequacy standards.86 The scope 
of the state laws vary—some apply to all plans with provider networks but 
others just apply to subsets of the insurance market, such as health 
maintenance organizations or individual market plans.87 
c. NAIC Model Act on Network Adequacy 
In 2015, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) 
released an updated Network Adequacy Model Act.88 The Model Act is 
not binding upon any state, but serves as a model to guide state legislation. 
Unlike the ACA’s network adequacy standards, the Model Act extends 
 
 
 84.  See Noble, supra note 80. 
 85.  See, e.g., 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/13.20 (2015) (requiring “the family . . . not have to 
travel more than an additional 15 miles or an additional 30 minutes to the network provider than it 
would have to travel to a non-network provider who is available to provide the same service”); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-515 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (requiring “[f]or urban 
areas, a provider network that is available to all persons enrolled in the plan within thirty (30) miles or 
thirty (30) minutes of each person's place of residence or work, to the extent that services are 
available.”); MINN. STAT. § 62K.10 (2016) (limiting the travel time to the nearest “primary care 
services, mental health services, and general hospital services” to thirty miles or thirty minutes, sixty 
miles or sixty minutes for the nearest “provider of specialty physician services, ancillary services, 
specialized hospital services, and . . . other health services,” and requiring that networks “include a 
sufficient number and type of providers.”) (emphasis added); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1305.302 (2015) 
(“Each network shall provide that network services are sufficiently accessible and available as 
necessary to ensure that the distance from any point in the network's service area to a point of service 
by a treating doctor or general hospital is not greater than 30 miles in non-rural areas and 60 miles in 
rural areas and that the distance from any point in the network's service area to a point of service by a 
specialist or specialty hospital is not greater than 75 miles in non-rural areas and 75 miles in rural 
areas.”). 
 86.  See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2356 (LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (“Each managed 
health insurance issuer that offers a plan that limits its enrollees' choice of providers shall maintain a 
network that is sufficient in numbers and types of providers to assure that all covered benefits to 
covered persons will be accessible without unreasonable delay.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-J:7 
(2017) (“A health carrier shall maintain a network that is sufficient in numbers, types, and geographic 
location of providers to ensure that all services to covered persons will be accessible without 
unreasonable delay.”).  
 87.  See GIOVANELLI ET AL., supra note 83, at 3 fig.1.  
 88.  HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN NETWORK ACCESS & ADEQUACY MODEL ACT (NAT’L ASS’N OF 
INS. COMM’RS 2015) [hereinafter NAIC MODEL ACT], http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-74.pdf.  
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beyond exchange plans to all health plans in a state that use provider 
networks.89  
The Model Act requires all network plans to “maintain a network that 
is sufficient in numbers and appropriate types of providers, including those 
that serve predominantly low-income and medically underserved 
individuals, to assure that all covered services to covered persons, 
including children and adults, will be accessible without unreasonable 
travel or delay.”90 The Model Act requires all provider networks obtain a 
determination from the state insurance commissioner that those networks 
are adequate.91 Although the Model Act does not prescribe quantifiable 
standards for distance or time traveled, it provides a range of factors that 
the commissioner can consider when determining network adequacy.92 
When an enrollee cannot access an in-network provider without 
unreasonable travel or delay, the Model Act would require the plan to 
provide the enrollee access to an out-of-network provider at an in-network 
level of benefits, including cost-sharing.93   
Related to network adequacy are requirements for updating provider 
directories to make timely and accurate lists of in-network providers 
available to those who are shopping for health insurance or covered 
services. Updated and accurate provider directories are necessary for 
consumers to be able to select in-network providers and plans, and for 
regulators to assess network adequacy.94 Several states have implemented 
 
 
 89.  NAIC MODEL ACT § 4 (applying the Act to “network plans”); NAIC Model Act § 3.S. 
(defining “network plans” as plans that either require or incentivize (financially or otherwise) enrollees 
to use providers that are managed, owned, under contract with, or employed by an enrollee’s insurer).  
 90.  NAIC MODEL ACT § 5.A(1).  
 91.  NAIC MODEL ACT § 5.B. This marks a change from the prior NAIC Model Act on network 
adequacy, which left it to the insurance carriers themselves to determine whether their provider 
networks were adequate. See FAMILIES USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE 
COMMISSIONERS (NAIC) NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT: SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS 2, 
http://familiesusa.org/sites/default/files/documents/Families-USA-NAIC-Network-Adequacy-
Summary.pdf.  
 92.  NAIC MODEL ACT § 5.A. Insurance commissioners may establish network sufficiency by 
“any reasonable criteria, which may include, but are not limited to:” ratios of providers to covered 
persons; geographic accessibility of providers; wait times; hours of operation; ability to meet needs of 
low-income persons, those with serious, chronic, or complex conditions, physical or mental 
disabilities, or limited English proficiency; the availability of tele-health, mobile clinics, and other 
delivery options; and the volume of specialty care services available. Id. 
 93.  NAIC MODEL ACT § 5.C. 
 94.  See Simon F. Haeder et al., Secret Shoppers Find Access to Providers and Network 
Adequacy for Those in Marketplace and Commercial Plans, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1160, 1165 (2016) 
(“Network listing accuracy issues are distinct but inherently related to network adequacy issues. 
Inaccurate provider directories are challenging for patients attempting to access providers, and they 
make it difficult for regulators to assess network adequacy.”). 
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requirements for more frequent updating of provider directories, such as 
quarterly or monthly.95  
Regulation of network adequacy and provider directories are best 
understood as building blocks for patient protection, but are not effective 
bulwarks, standing alone, against surprise medical bills and other financial 
distress from out-of-network services. For example, network adequacy 
requirements simply establish a floor of minimal sufficiency, but even if 
adopted, they do not eliminate narrow networks. In emergencies, under 
anesthesia, or at an in-network facility, none of these laws prevent patients 
from receiving care from an out-of-network provider or the surprise bill 
that follows. As such, the Model Act pairs network adequacy requirements 
with more explicit protections against surprise medical bills, described 
below.96 
3. Surprise Medical Bills and Balance-Billing Laws 
A number of states have begun to pass legislation targeting surprise 
bills and balance-billing directly. Surprise medical bills can be considered 
a subset of balance bills for out-of-network service. The difference is that 
surprise bills are also involuntary and unanticipated, whereas balance bills 
may be voluntary or expected if a person knowingly obtains out-of-
network care.  
a. State Laws on Surprise Medical Bills 
 Prior to the recent efforts by states to address surprise medical bills, 
several states already provided insured patients with some degree of 
protection from balance-billing by out-of-network providers,97 including 
California, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, and West Virginia.98 Many of these 
 
 
 95.  See GIOVANELLI ET AL., supra note 83, at 4–6; see, e.g., S.B. 302, 153rd Gen. Assemb. (Ga. 
2016) (signed into law Apr. 26, 2016, to be codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20C-1); H.B. 131, 436th 
Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2016) (signed into law Apr. 26, 2016).  
 96.  See infra text accompanying notes 127–32. 
 97.  Surprise bills often include balance bills but also include out-of-network cost-sharing. 
Balance bills also can be non-surprises if they are intentionally triggered by a patient who knowingly 
chooses to receive out-of-network care. Nearly every state prohibits balance-billing by in-network 
providers to managed care enrollees. Pollitz, supra note 41.  
 98.  Prospect Med. Grp., Inc. v. Northridge Emergency Med. Grp., 198 P.3d 86, 92 (Cal. 2009) 
(ruling that health maintence organization (HMO) members may not be balanced-billed for emergency 
services in California); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3565 (2011) (protecting members of “individual and 
group health insurance policies” from balance-billing); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 2322F (2009) 
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laws only prevent balance-bills for out-of-network emergency services, 
while others cover a broader range of covered benefits.99 As noted above, 
surprise bills and balance bills can arise outside the emergency context, 
such as when the hospital is in-network, but the surgeon or 
anesthesiologist is out-of-network.100 State laws prohibiting balance-
billing may not eliminate the financial burden of a surprise medical bill 
because a patient who inadvertently receives out-of-network care may still 
owe more than if the care were in-network because of higher cost-sharing 
rates, separate or higher deductibles, and the lack of an out-of-pocket 
spending cap.101 At the federal level, Medicare prohibits participating 
providers from balance-billing Medicare beneficiaries and limits non-
participating providers from balance-billing more than 15% of the 
Medicare rate for the service.102   
More recently, states have begun passing legislation to more 
specifically address the phenomenon of surprise medical bills. These state 
surprise medical billing laws generally take one or more of the following 
approaches: (1) require providers to disclose out-of-network status to 
patients and to obtain informed consent from patients (disclosure/informed 
 
 
(protecting those covered by workers compensation from balance-billing); FLA. STAT. § 641.3154 
(2010) (protecting HMO members from balance-billing for non-network emergency care); IND. CODE 
§ 32-33-4-3.5 (2013) (prohibiting hospital lienholders from balance-billing patients); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 19-710(i) (West 2013) (holding HMO subscribers harmless for covered services in- 
and out-of-network and mandating HMO payment to noncontractual providers); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 
11:3-29.6 (Lexis Advance through 2017) (protecting “any person” from balance-billing by health care 
providers); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 449.34 (1990) (prohibiting any primary health care practitioner, or 
any primary health center, corporation, facility, institution, or other entity that employs a health care 
practitioner from balance billing); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-41-26 (Lexis Advance through 2016) (protects 
enrollees of an HMO from balance-billing by “any provider” for charges for covered health services); 
UTAH CODE § 31A-8-501(5) (prohibits out-of-network providers from balance billing when an HMO 
or preferred provider organization enrollee lives or resides within 30 miles of a federally qualified 
health center or independent hospital or is in closer proximity to these providers than another 
contracting hospital); W. VA CODE § 33-25A-7a (1996) (protecting HMO members from balance 
billing if the provider is aware patient is HMO subscriber). In addition, Colorado requires managed 
care companies to hold members harmless for out-of-network balance bills, but it does not prevent the 
provider from balance-billing. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-704(2)(a) (2006).  
 99.  See Pollitz, supra note 41. 
 100.  See, e.g., Roni Caryn Rabin, Out-of-Network Bills for In-Network Health Care, N.Y. TIMES: 
WELL BLOG (Nov. 19, 2012, 4:23 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/out-of-network-
bills-for-in-network-health-care/; Tara Siegel Bernard, Out of Network, Not by Choice, and Facing 
Huge Health Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/19/your-
money/out-of-network-not-by-choice-and-facing-huge-health-bills.html. 
 101.  See HALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 6–7.  
 102.  42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(A) (2012) (prohibiting participating providers from charging 
individuals for items or services for which such individual is entitled to have payment made under 
Medicare); 42 C.F.R. § 414.48 (2017) (nonparticipating providers may charge a beneficiary an amount 
up to 115% of the Medicare fee schedule amount). See Pollitz, supra note 41. 
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consent); (2) limit balance-billing and amounts that out-of-network 
providers may collect from patients, usually to in-network payment levels 
(limit charges/balance-billing); or (3) provide for dispute resolution 
mechanisms to determine payment amounts for out-of-network services 
among providers, patients, and payers (dispute resolution).103 Thus far, 
New York, Connecticut, California, Florida, and Texas have passed laws 
curtailing surprise medical billing.  
New York pioneered such legislation in its “Emergency Medical 
Services and Surprise Bills” law.104 New York’s law adopts all three 
requirements of disclosure and informed consent, refraining from balance-
billing, and requiring dispute resolution. Out-of-network providers that 
accept assignment of the patient’s benefits (i.e., agree to accept payment 
from the patient’s health plan) may not bill the patient more than in-
network amounts, including balance-billing and/or out-of-network cost-
sharing, unless the patient consents after full disclosure.105 If an out-of-
network provider does not accept assignment of benefits or if the patient is 
uninsured, then the patient may submit any surprise bill amounts to 
independent dispute resolution.106 For out-of-network emergency services, 
physicians may not balance-bill or charge the patient more than in-network 
cost-sharing amounts.107 The New York law generally tries to remove the 
patient from any dispute over surprise bills, leaving it to providers and 
payers to work out how much the out-of-network rate will be, using 
binding, independent dispute resolution to determine the rate if the parties 
cannot come to an agreement.108 New York uses “baseball style” 
arbitration, where the provider and health plan each submit their best and 
final offer to the arbitrator, who then must select the offer that best 
 
 
 103.  See Seth Bills & Wendy Rogaliner, Lawmakers Weigh in as Battle over Surprise Billing 
Continues, A.B.A. HEALTH ESOURCE (May 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/aba_ 
health_esource/2015-2016/may/lawmakers-weigh-in-as-battle-over-surprise-billing-continues-.html; 
CONSUMERS UNION, GETTING STARTED ON SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS: AN ADVOCATE’S GUIDE 5 
(2015), http://consumersunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/SurprisebillsAdvocatesGuide.pdf. 
 104.  N.Y. INS. LAW § 3241(c) (McKinney 2016); N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW art. 6 (McKinney 
2016). This law went into effect on April 1, 2015.  
 105.  N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW §§ 603(h), 606, 607(a) (McKinney 2016). 
 106.  N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 607(b) (McKinney 2016).  
 107.  N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 605 (McKinney 2016). If the health plan and the out-of-network 
emergency physician cannot agree on fees or if the patient is uninsured, then the parties can submit the 
claim for independent dispute resolution to receive a binding determination of fees. Id. 
 108.  N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 607 (McKinney 2016). Uninsured patients may also submit a claim 
for dispute resolution regarding bills for emergency services and for physicians in hospitals and 
ambulatory surgery centers from whom they have not received timely disclosures, upon approval of 
the superintendent. Id. §§ 605(b), 607(b).  
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approximates UCR, without itself independently determining what rate 
will be paid.109  
Connecticut adopted prohibitions against surprise medical bills similar 
to New York’s, such that an insured patient would only owe the applicable 
in-network cost-sharing amount for out-of-network services that she did 
not knowingly elect over an available in-network provider.110 Although the 
Connecticut law does not provide a dispute resolution mechanism, it does 
give the patient an important remedy—the statute allows a patient who 
receives a surprise bill from an out-of-network provider in excess of what 
the patient would owe under her plan’s in-network rate to seek actual 
damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief under the Connecticut 
Unfair Trade Practices Act.111 Connecticut imposes requirements on health 
insurance carriers as well: (1) they may not require greater cost-sharing of 
the enrollee for surprise out-of-network services than would be required 
for in-network care,112 (2) they are required to reimburse the out-of-
network provider for surprise bills at the in-network rate as payment in full 
(unless they agree otherwise with the provider),113 (3) plans must include 
in their description of coverage an explanation of surprise bills, and (4) 
they must inform the enrollee of the network status of providers and an 
estimate of how much the insurer will pay for the service.114 For out-of-
network emergency services, health plans must pay, at minimum, UCR, 
which is defined as the 80th percentile of all charges for the service by 
providers in the same geographic area as reported in a nonprofit, third-
 
 
 109.  HALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 22; JACK HOADLEY ET AL., THE CTR. ON HEALTH INS. 
REFORMS, BALANCE BILLING: HOW ARE STATES PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM UNEXPECTED 
CHARGES? 13 (2015) (noting that this baseball-style arbitration is considered more efficient because 
the arbitrator only has to choose one of the numbers, not figure out the precise rate that is UCR, and 
because the system encourages the parties to come up with real approximations of UCR because of the 
coin-toss nature of the outcome).  
 110.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-477aa (2016). The definition of “surprise bill” excludes 
emergency services, but a similar provision prohibits out-of-network providers from billing a patient 
for out-of-network cost-sharing or balance-billing for emergency services. Id. § 38a-477aa(a)(6)(A).  
 111.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-7f(b) (2016). The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act is set 
forth at CONN. GEN. STAT. ch. 735a. Relevant to the discussion on credit reporting practices infra Part 
II.C., it is also an unfair trade practice under Connecticut’s law for a heath care provider to report a 
patient’s unpaid surprise medical bill to a credit reporting agency. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-7f(c) 
(2016).  
 112.  CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-477aa(c), (d).  
 113.  Id. § 38a-477aa(c)(2). The health carrier and out-of-network provider may agree to a 
different rate, but essentially, the statute requires out-of-network providers at in-network facilities to 
accept the in-network rate as payment in full, with prohibitions on charging the patient higher cost-
sharing or balance bills.  
 114.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-591b.  
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party benchmarking database.115  
California’s surprise billing law protects patients who receive care at an 
in-network facility116 from higher cost-sharing and balance-billing from 
out-of-network providers.117 California’s law incorporates disclosure and 
consent, limits on the amounts charged for surprise bills, and voluntary, 
binding dispute resolution. The law prohibits providers from charging 
patients more than the in-network cost-sharing amount that the patient 
would owe if the provider were in-network, unless the patient has 
consented in writing to pay the out-of-network charges at least twenty-four 
hours in advance.118 Health plans are required to provide in their contracts 
that enrollees shall pay no more than in-network cost-sharing amounts to 
out-of-network providers at in-network facilities, which becomes 
significant for purposes of ERISA, as discussed below.119 The law 
establishes a binding, independent dispute resolution process that health 
plans and non-contracted providers may elect to use to resolve appeals of 
the amount paid by the plan.120  
The California law also includes certain innovations that extend 
protections beyond those of other states. First, and most significantly, 
California’s law presumptively defines the amount the health plan owes 
the out-of-network provider as the greater of 125% of the Medicare rate or 
the plan’s “average contracted rate” for similar services in the geographic 
area.121 Second, the law provides that any cost-sharing paid by the patient 
 
 
 115.  Id § 38a-477aa(b)(3)(A). For out-of-network emergency services, the health insurance 
carrier must pay the greatest of (i) the in-network rate for the services; (ii) the UCR rate, calculated as 
the 80th percentile of all charges for the service in the geographic area, as reported to a nonprofit 
benchmarking database; or (iii) the Medicare rate. Id. In practice, the UCR rate will likely be the 
greatest amount. See, e.g., FAIRHEALTH, UNDERSTANDING OUT-OF-NETWORK REIMBURSEMENT 
(2012), http://www.fairhealth.org/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=%2001560000000YVRj. 
 116.  The law applies to providers at hospitals, ambulatory surgery centers, laboratories, and 
imaging centers. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9; CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8. 
 117.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9; CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8. California separately 
prohibits balance-billing by out-of-network providers in emergencies. See Prospect Med. Grp., Inc. v. 
Northridge Emergency Med. Grp., 198 P.3d 86 (Cal. 2009) (ruling that HMO members may not be 
balance-billed). 
 118.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(a), (c); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8(a), (c). 
 119.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(a), (c); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8(a), (c). For the 
discussion of ERISA, see infra Part IV.  
 120.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.30; CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.81.  
 121.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.31(a); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.82(a) (“[U]nless 
otherwise agreed to by the noncontracting individual health professional and the plan, the plan shall 
reimburse the greater of the average contracted rate or 125% of the amount Medicare reimburses on a 
fee-for-service basis for the same or similar services in the general geographic region in which the 
services were rendered.”). The law requires health plans to submit their average contracted rates to the 
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to the out-of-network provider at an in-network facility shall count toward 
the patient’s annual limit on out-of-pocket expenses and in-network 
deductible.122 Third, the exception for patients who voluntarily consent to 
receive services from an out-of-network provider requires the patient to be 
provided with a binding written estimate of their total out-of-pocket 
costs.123 Fourth, the law limits out-of-network providers from initiating 
debt collection or credit reporting on more than the in-network cost-
sharing amount, and prohibits the use of wage garnishment or liens on 
primary residences to collect unpaid bills.124 
Florida’s law relieves patients of any obligation to pay balance-billing 
or higher cost-sharing amounts to out-of-network providers at in-network 
facilities where the patient “does not have the ability and opportunity to 
choose a participating provider at the facility who is available to treat the 
insured.”125 Instead, the patient’s health plan is solely responsible for 
paying the out-of-network provider, and if the amounts are disputed, they 
can be resolved by a court or through voluntary, binding dispute 
resolution.126 The Florida law makes willful and frequent violations of the 
rules on surprise billing an unfair trade practice for health plans and 
grounds for disciplinary action and loss of licensure for providers.127   
Texas does not prohibit balance bills, but it uses both disclosure and 
dispute resolution mechanisms to provide limited protection to consumers 
from surprise medical bills. A patient has the right to submit to mediation, 
which is nonbinding, any bills over $500 from out-of-network facility-
based providers at a facility that is in-network for the patient or from an 
emergency care provider.128 A facility-based provider may not have to 
 
 
Department of Managed Health Care or the Commissioner of Insurance, but these rates will not be 
publicly available. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.31(a); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.82(a).  
 122.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(b); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8(b). 
 123.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(c)(3); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8(c)(3).  
 124.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(e); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8(e). 
 125.  FLA. STAT. § 627.64194(3)(b).  
 126.  Id. § 627.64194(6). For out-of-network emergency services, the insurer is solely liable for 
payment except for the patient’s applicable in-network cost-sharing amounts. Id. § 627.64194(2)). 
 127.  Id. §§ 456.072(1)(oo); 626.9541(1)(gg).  
 128.  TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.051(a) (West 2016). This provision was amended in 2017 by 
S.B. 507 to (1) apply to a broader range of services, including emergency services; (2) mandate a 
notice in balance bills of the right to mediation for out-of-network medical bills, and (3) expand the 
protection to Texans who participate in the Teacher’s Retirement System. See Press Release, Kelly 
Hancock, Senate of Texas, Texas Legislature Passes Balance Billing Mediation Expansion (May 11, 
2017), http://www.senate.texas.gov/members/d09/press/en/p20170511a.pdf. The law was amended to 
define facility-based provider as “a physician, health care practitioner, or other health care provider 
who provides health care or medical services to patients of a facility.” S.B. 507, 85th Leg. (Tex. 2017) 
(to be codified at TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.001(4)).  
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submit to mediation if she discloses to the patient her out-of-network 
status and an estimate of charges, the patient provides written 
acknowledgement of the disclosure, and the provider does not ultimately 
charge the patient more than estimated.129 Unlike the other states’ surprise 
billing laws, the patient is left to resolve disputes over surprise billing with 
the provider and plan, rather than letting providers and plans work out 
payment on their own.  
Thus far, New York, Connecticut, California, Florida, and Texas, have 
enacted laws to curb surprise billing, and many other states are also 
considering legislation on surprise medical bills.130  
b. NAIC Model Act Provisions for Surprise Medical Bills 
As states consider surprise billing laws, a prominent model is provided 
by the NAIC Model Act, which contains a measure to curb surprise 
medical bills.131 The Model Act’s surprise billing provisions contain 
elements of disclosure, limits on out-of-network cost-sharing and balance-
billing, and dispute resolution. Under the Model Act, health facilities must 
provide patients with prior written notice if the patient will be receiving 
non-emergency services from an out-of-network provider at an in-network 
facility, including a description of the associated charges.132 Health plans 
would be required to apply in-network cost-sharing rates for surprise 
medical bills for both emergency and non-emergency services.133 The 
Model Act would not require plans to hold patients harmless for surprise 
balance bills. Instead, out-of-network providers would be required to offer 
patients three choices regarding balance-billing amounts: (1) pay the 
balance bill, (2) for balance bill amounts greater than $500, send the bill to 
the patient’s health plan to be resolved with the provider through 
mediation, or (3) rely on any other rights and remedies that may be 
 
 
 129.  TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1467.051(c), (d) (West 2016) (providing that the written estimate 
is not binding, but the facility based provider may not be required to mediate the bill with the patient if 
the amount is less than or equal to the estimate). 
 130.  See, e.g., Surprise Billing & Consumer Prot. Act,” S.B. 8, 2017-18 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017); 
Out-of-Network Consumer Prot., Transparency, Cost Containment & Accountability Act, Assemb. 
No. 1952. 217th Leg. (N.J. 2016); Emergency Med. & Health Care Servs. Surprise Billing Prevention 
Act, S.B. 1158, 2015 Sess. (Pa. 2015); S.B. 2107, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2016). 
 131.  NAIC MODEL ACT § 7.   
 132.  Id. § 7B.  
 133.  This only applies to health plans subject to state insurance regulation (i.e., not self-funded 
ERISA plans). See infra Part III.A.  
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available in the state.134 Similar to California or Connecticut, the Model 
Act would create a benchmark for what constitutes a reasonable out-of-
network rate, defined as the higher of the plan’s highest in-network rate or 
a set percentage of Medicare’s applicable rate for the same services.135 
Although the Model Act contemplates administrative enforcement 
mechanisms, unlike Connecticut and Florida, it does not create a private 
cause of action under the state’s unfair business or trade practices act.136 
Overall, the Model Act’s consumer protections are weaker than most of 
the state laws on surprise billing because it does not prohibit balance-
billing patients, it does not remove patients from disputes, and the dispute 
resolution mechanism of mediation is nonbinding. 
In sum, although only a handful of states have passed surprise medical 
billing laws to date, state legislation has been comprehensive and 
somewhat varied in approach. When it comes to health care consumer 
protections, states are epitomizing their role as federalism laboratories.  
c. Federal Action on Surprise Medical Bills 
The federal government, by contrast, appears to be taking a more 
incremental approach. In 2016, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) issued a very limited measure to address surprise medical 
bills for exchange plan enrollees in its 2017 Benefit Payment Parameters 
Rule.137 Starting in 2018, enrollees in health plans sold on exchanges may 
count cost-sharing amounts for out-of-network ancillary providers at in-
network facilities toward their annual in-network limit on cost-sharing, 
unless the plan provided notice to the enrollee forty-eight hours in advance 
or at the time of prior authorization.138 The rule does not, however, apply 
 
 
 134.  NAIC MODEL ACT § 7D. Although the Model Act refers to “mediation,” which is 
nonbinding, it is not clear whether the NAIC intended to exclude the possibility of a binding dispute 
resolution procedure. Background materials refer to “mandatory binding mediation,” which may refer 
to something more akin to binding arbitration. HEALTH MGMT. ASSOCS., ENSURING CONSUMERS’ 
ACCESS TO CARE: NETWORK ADEQUACY STATE INSURANCE SURVEY FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATORY REFORMS IN A CHANGING INSURANCE MARKET 30 (2014), 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_conliaison_network_adequacy_report.pdf.  
 135.  NAIC MODEL ACT § 7F. 
 136.  NAIC MODEL ACT § 7.I. (providing that enforcement would be through the state consumer 
protection agencies, the attorney general, and the insurance department). 
 137.  Notice of Benefit & Payment Parameters for 2017, 81 Fed. Reg. 12204, 12304-12306 
(Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Mar. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(e)).  
 138.  HHS Notice of Benefit & Payment Parameters for 2017, 81 Fed. Reg. at 12305. CMS 
describes an “ancillary provider” as a “provider of a service ancillary to what is being provided by the 
primary provider, such as anesthesiology or radiology[,] rather than the services supplied by the 
primary provider.” Id.  
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to the balance-billing amounts owed by the enrollee, only cost-sharing 
such as deductibles, co-insurance, or co-pays.139 Acknowledging that this 
provides very limited protection against surprise medical bills, CMS 
justified its approach by saying it was monitoring ongoing progress by 
states, the NAIC, and others, and noting that its rules do not preempt state 
laws prohibiting balance-billing.140 Indeed, because the statutory definition 
of “cost-sharing” excludes balance-billing, CMS lacks the authority to 
address the balance-billing component of surprise bills.141 Accordingly, 
the federal government lacks statutory authority and perhaps the 
inclination to comprehensively address surprise billing, so the states have 
taken the lead to address surprise bills in lieu of a federal solution.  
President Obama’s 2017 budget included legislative measures to 
address surprise medical bills.142 The Obama administration proposed 
limiting surprise out-of-network bills by requiring hospitals to take 
reasonable steps to match patients with in-network providers. If the 
hospital fails to match the patient with the in-network provider, the out-of-
network provider would be required to accept the in-network fees as 
payment in full.143 Congress did not take up the measure, but the issue of 
surprise medical bills has been the subject of at least one reform bill.144 
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the Trump administration will be 
similarly inclined to address surprise medical bills.145 
4. Gaps in Policies for Surprise Medical Bills 
The state law initiatives on surprise medical billing and balance-billing 
are starting to create fairly robust protections against surprise medical bills 
for consumers. Many of the substantive, as opposed to structural, limits of 
state surprise medical billing laws are amenable to state innovation. New 
 
 
 139.  See Timothy Jost, The 2017 Benefit and Payment Parameters Final Rule: Drilling Down 
(Part 2), HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 2, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/03/02/the-2017-
benefit-and-payment-parameters-final-rule-drilling-down-part-2/.  
 140.  Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2017, 81 Fed. Reg. at 12305.  
 141.  See supra text accompanying note 71. 
 142.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2017 137 
tbl.S-9 (2016).  
 143.  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET IN BRIEF 116 
(2016), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/fy2017-budget-in-brief.pdf. 
 144.  End Surprise Billing Act of 2015, H.R. 3770, 114th Cong. (2015).  
 145.  President Trump’s HHS Secretary, Tom Price, previously proposed legislation that would 
allow physicians to balance-bill Medicare patients for amounts above Medicare’s fees, which is 
currently prohibited. Medicare Patient Empowerment Act, H.R. 1700, 112th Cong. (introduced May 3, 
2011).  
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York, Connecticut, and California, in particular, have passed surprise 
billing laws that contain substantive differences, but are fairly 
comprehensive in terms of protecting patients from surprise bills.146 Part II 
contains further discussion about various combinations of policies and 
tradeoffs that could be recommended for a model state surprise billing 
law, building on these state innovations.147 Standards for network 
adequacy, however, are quite difficult to enforce. The regulator must 
gather a daunting amount of information, including checking to see which 
physicians are accepting new patients, to meaningfully evaluate network 
adequacy.148 
A significant limit of these surprise billing laws is geographic—only a 
handful of states have passed these laws. Consumers in the majority of 
states without such laws have little recourse or protection if they receive a 
surprise medical bill. However, many state legislatures are interested in 
pursuing measures to protect consumers from surprise bills.149  
Another limit is legally constructed—to the extent they regulate health 
plans, state laws on network adequacy or surprise billing are subject to 
preemption by ERISA. An in-depth analysis of ERISA preemption of state 
health care consumer protections is set forth in Part III, below. But in 
practical terms, many of these emerging state consumer protections are 
simply inapplicable and unavailable if the consumer is one of the millions 
insured by an employer-based health plan, particularly a self-funded plan.  
B. Opaque Prices and Facility Fees 
Though medical care ranks among the most expensive items or services 
a person can expect to buy in a lifetime, a consumer typically has no idea 
what it will cost until after she has consumed the service and receives the 
bill.150 Two factors make the experience of “shopping” and being billed 
for health care uncommonly confusing and nearly impossible to navigate 
as a rational consumer would—a lack of transparency and up-front 
estimates of cost and à la carte billing such as added facility fees. 
 
 
 146.  See supra text accompanying notes 100–20.  
 147.  See infra Part II.A. 
 148.  See Haeder et al., supra note 94, at 1165. 
 149.  See, e.g., S.B. 206, 71st Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017); H.B. 71, 154th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017); S.B. 7, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017); H.B. 2164, 190th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017); H.B. 995, 99th Gen. Assemb, First Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017); 
H.B. 313, 53rd Leg. Sess., First Sess. (N.M. 2017); H.B. 5012, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2017); S.B. 
272, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2017); H.B. 2327, 83rd Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2017). 
 150.  See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., supra note 54, at 9–10 (noting the difficulty for 
consumers to comparison shop for care).  
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One of the most widely reported problems with medical bills is the 
inability of patients to access meaningful price or quality information 
about their health care before the service is rendered.151 One journalist 
describes spending ten hours on the phone with various hospitals trying to 
get an estimate of how much it would cost for his pregnant wife’s 
uncomplicated delivery, and found hospitals were both unwilling and 
unable to give him a price quote.152 Despite a recent proliferation of price 
transparency tools, the accuracy and usability of this information remains 
poor.153 Even if one can get a provider to give a cost estimate, these quotes 
are not binding on the provider,154 so the patient cannot rely upon price 
quotes and has no recourse if the estimate turns out to be wrong.  
Health care is also billed à la carte, with the patient receiving separate 
bills from each facility and physician who participated in the patient’s 
care.155 A troubling example is when facility fees are added to the 
physician’s charge for outpatient care.156 Although they are both 
 
 
 151.  See Morgan A. Muir et al., Clarifying Costs: Can Increased Price Transparency Reduce 
Healthcare Spending?, 4 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 319 (2013); Jaime A. Rosenthal et al., Availability 
of Consumer Prices from US Hospitals for a Common Surgical Procedure, 173 JAMA INTERNAL 
MED. 427 (2013) (finding that only 16% of hospitals studied could provide a full price quote for a 
total hip replacement for a fictitious sixty-two year-old uninsured grandmother); Andrew Steinmetz & 
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, What Does a Hip Replacement Cost? The Transparency Imperative in 2013, 173 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 432 (2013); see also Betsy Q. Cliff, Explainer: Why Can’t Anyone Tell Me 
How Much This Surgery Will Cost?, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 12, 2016, 6:14 AM), 
http://theconversation.com/explainer-why-cant-anyone-tell-me-how-much-this-surgery-will-cost-
51013; Johnny Harris, I Tried to Find Out How Much My Son’s Birth Would Cost. No One Would Tell 
Me., VOX (May 5, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2016/5/5/11591592/birth-cost-hospital-bills.  
 152.  See Harris, supra note 151.  
 153.  See, e.g., Anna D. Sinaiko et al., Cost-Sharing Obligations, High Deductible Health Plan 
Growth, and Shopping for Health Care: Enrollees with Skin in the Game, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 
395 (2016); see also Reed Abelson, Online Tools to Shop for Doctors Snag on Healthcare’s 
Complexity, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/business 
/online-tools-to-shop-for-doctors-snag-on-health-cares-complexity.html; Cliff, supra note 151 
(describing using various consumer-oriented health care price comparison tools for spinal fusion 
surgery at a particular hospital and obtaining price estimates ranging from $9,350–$71,000); Elana 
Gordon, Patients Want to Price-Shop for Care, but Online Tools Unreliable, NPR (Nov. 30, 2015, 
4:54 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/11/30/453087857/patients-want-to-price-
shop-for-care-but-online-tools-unreliable.  
 154.  See Khazan, supra note 8. 
 155.  See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the 
New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 657 (2008); Sandra G. Boodman, Extra Health-
Care Facility Fees Take Many Patients by Surprise, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/05/AR2009100502910.html. 
 156.  Carol M. Ostrom, Why You Might Pay Twice for One Visit to Doctor, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 
5, 2012, 10:52 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/why-you-might-pay-twice-for-one-
visit-to-doctor/. 
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unanticipated, these facility fees differ from surprise medical bills because 
they are not limited to out-of-network services. The lack of transparency 
of added outpatient facility fees is especially shocking when the patient 
previously paid only one, lesser charge for the same service.157 It is akin to 
going to a restaurant where you have dined before, but receiving an 
additional bill for use of the restaurant’s space, tables, plates, utensils, 
lighting, and furniture.  
Facility fees stem from the fragmented way we pay for medical care. 
Medicare pays facilities and physician services using different 
methodologies, which vary based on the location or site of clinical care.158 
Hospital outpatient departments are paid more than physicians’ offices for 
performing the same type of service, in large part because hospital 
outpatient settings can charge a facility fee in addition to the physician’s 
professional service fee.159 By contrast, fees for services at physicians’ 
offices usually include both the professional and overhead costs of the 
service in a single charge.160 This pricing difference based on location, 
also called the “site-of-service differential,” is replicated by private 
payers.161  
Corporate consolidation of hospitals and physicians may reduce the 
incidence of surprise billing because physicians employed by a hospital 
are more likely to be in the same health plan networks as the hospital.162 
Nevertheless, the consolidation of hospitals and physician practices may 
lead to higher total spending for outpatient services by exploiting the fact 
that hospital-based services are typically reimbursed at higher rates than 
 
 
 157.  Eric Boodman, Visits to the Doctor Cost More as Hospitals Buy Practices, BOS. GLOBE 
(Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2015/10/19/when-hospitals-buy-doctors-practices-
patients-pay/bsK3hRYRyCNQFnqsD18WKK/story.html (discussing the Neprash et al. study, which 
concluded that higher outpatient prices were not explained by patients getting more services when 
doctors were acquired by hospitals). 
 158.  MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE 
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 27 (2013) [hereinafter MEDPAC 2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS], 
http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/june-2016-report-to-the-congress-medicare-and-
the-health-care-delivery-system.pdf. 
 159.  Amanda Cassidy, Health Policy Brief: Site Neutral Payments, HEALTH AFF. 3 (July 24, 
2014), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_121.pdf. 
 160.  MEDPAC 2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 158, at 32; Cassidy, supra note 159, at 3. 
 161.  James D. Reschovsky & Chapin White, Location, Location, Location: Hospital Outpatient 
Prices Much Higher than Community Settings for Identical Services, NAT’L INST. HEALTH CARE 
REFORM, 1, 1–2 (June 2014), https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-
findings/publications/location-location-location-hospital-outpatient-prices-much-higher-tha-
community-settings-for-identical-services. 
 162.  See Garmon & Chartock, supra note 45, at 180.  
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identical services provided in physician-based locations.163 The fact that 
hospitals can charge an additional facility fee for acquired physicians’ 
services is one of the financial incentives driving hospital-physician 
integration.164  
Hospitals argue that facility fees are necessary to compensate them for 
the expenses of maintaining standby capacity to service acute care needs 
that may present at any time.165 A facility fee to cover the costs of 
maintaining a continuously open emergency room may be justified,166 but 
in cases where the added facility fee is simply the result of the hospital’s 
acquisition of the physician’s practice there is no difference in standby 
capacity or overhead to justify the fee. Nothing has changed in terms of 
the location, supplies, technology, staffing, the duration, or intensity of the 
care.167 The higher price is merely the result of a change in corporate 
ownership, which allows the hospital to charge a facility fee for the 
acquired physician’s services as though it were rendered in an outpatient 
 
 
 163.  See Cory Capps et al., The Effect of Hospital Acquisitions of Physician Practices on Prices 
and Spending, 1, 6 (Inst. for Policy Research, Working Paper No. WP-15-02, 2015), 
http://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/publications/docs/workingpapers/2015/IPR-WP-15-02.pdf; ANN S. 
O'MALLEY ET AL., CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 136, RISING 
HOSPITAL EMPLOYMENT OF PHYSICIANS: BETTER QUALITY, HIGHER COSTS? 3 (2011).  
 164.  See Hannah T. Neprash et al., Association of Financial Integration Between Physicians and 
Hospitals with Commercial Health Care Prices, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1932, 1937 (2015); see 
also Margot Sanger-Katz, When Hospitals Buy Doctors’ Offices, and Patient Fees Soar, N.Y. TIMES: 
THE UPSHOT (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/upshot/medicare-proposal-would-
even-out-doctors-pay.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0.  
 165.  See MEDPAC 2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 158, at 28; see also Richard 
Umbdenstock, Letter to the Editor, The Case for Hospital Facility Fees, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-case-for-hospital-facility-fees/2012/12/30/ce79ebb6-
512b-11e2-835b-02f92c0daa43_story.html. Umbdenstock was writing as the President of the 
American Hospital Association and advocated that hospitals’ standby capacity costs “such as around-
the-clock availability of emergency services; emergency back-up for other settings of care; disaster 
preparedness; a wide range of staff and equipment” justify higher reimbursements for hospitals 
compared with other types of providers.   
 166.  See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, The Case of the $629 Band-Aid—And What It Reveals About 
American Health Care, VOX (May 13, 2016, 8:10 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/5/13/11606760/ 
emergency-facility-fees-american-health-care.  
 167.  See Local Hospitals Buy Medical Practices; Patients Forced to Pay, WSBTV.COM (Feb. 
12, 2015, 10:19 AM), http://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/local-hospitals-buy-medical-practices-
patients-for/53837305 (describing how cancer patient, Mike Rosenberg, was suddenly charged an 
additional $3000 facility fee for chemotherapy at Atlanta Cancer Care when it was acquired by 
Northside Hospital and quoting Rosenberg as saying, “the same doctors, the same chair, the same 
material, everything is exactly the same.”); Mathews, supra note 5 (quoting cardiac patient Hubbard 
who was charged a facility fee when his cardiologist’s practice was acquired by a hospital, “nothing 
had changed, it was the same equipment, the same room . . . .”).  
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department of the hospital.168 
The price increases from facility fees are significant. In 2012, Medicare 
paid 141% more for a level II echocardiogram and 70% more for a fifteen-
minute office visit in a hospital outpatient department than in a 
freestanding physician’s office.169 For private payers, the price difference 
between hospital outpatient departments and physicians’ offices ranged 
from 21% higher for office visits to 258% higher for chest radiography.170 
From the consumer’s perspective, receiving services in a “hospital 
outpatient department” (which may just be their physician’s office, newly 
acquired by a hospital) resulted in an average increase of 206% to 394% in 
out-of-pocket spending compared with receiving the same services in a 
freestanding physician’s office.171 Because of the increasing prevalence of 
high deductibles, many patients must pay all or much of the price increase 
out-of-pocket.172 Added facility fees are not fully explained by the 
differences in the sickness or acuity of patients receiving care at hospital 
outpatient departments versus freestanding community settings.173 In these 
cases, the added facility fees increase the cost of care without providing 
additional services or value to the patient’s health.174 
The following discussion explores two policy approaches to address 
these medical billing problems of price opacity and added facility fees—
price transparency efforts and site-neutral payments that eliminate facility 
fees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 168.  See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY 53 (2014) [hereinafter MEDPAC 2014 REPORT TO CONGRESS] (“This payment 
difference creates a financial incentive for hospitals to purchase freestanding physicians’ offices and 
convert them to HOPDs without changing their location or patient mix.”).  
 169.  MEDPAC 2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 158, at 31. In 2014, MedPAC reported 
that a level II echocardiogram would cost Medicare $228.02 in a physician’s office and $492.22 in a 
hospital outpatient department due to higher hospital facility fees. MEDPAC 2014 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 168, at 80 tbl.3–9.  
 170.  Aparna Higgins et al., National Estimates of Price Variation by Site of Care, 22 AM. J. 
MANAGED CARE e116, e117 (2016). 
 171.  Id. at e120. 
 172.  See Mathews, supra note 5 (describing how Hubbard had to pay about $1000 more out of 
pocket for his echocardiogram under his high-deductible plan when his cardiologist’s practice was 
acquired by a hospital system).  
 173.  Reschovsky & White, supra note 161, at 4.  
 174.  See Ostrom, supra note 156 (quoting Group Health Cooperative CEO, Scott Armstrong, as 
saying, “Facility fees demonstrate how the fee-for-service system can inflate cost without in any way 
contributing to the health of patients.”). 
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1. Price Transparency 
State price transparency efforts attempt to penetrate the opacity and 
secrecy around health care prices and quality. Consumers of health care 
cannot comparison shop for health care without information about prices 
and quality, which are kept secret by contractual confidentiality clauses or 
by the sheer complexity of a system where each service has different 
prices and methods of calculating rates depending on the payer.175 
Although many states have passed some form of legislation to promote 
health care price transparency, only a handful of states provide consumers 
with meaningful tools for consumers to compare the prices they can expect 
to pay under their health plan for both inpatient and outpatient care.176 
According to the Catalyst for Payment Reform, the most robust and useful 
state price transparency tools are built upon data reported to state all-payer 
claims databases (APCDs) on the amounts paid for services (reflecting 
negotiated prices and patient cost-sharing), as opposed to the less helpful 
amounts charged.177 The best state price transparency tools make APCD 
data available to consumers via a searchable, public website that allows 
price and quality comparisons among a wide range of providers.178 
Examples of states with consumer-friendly price transparency websites 
built on ACPD data are Colorado, Maine, New Hampshire, and Oregon.179  
Price transparency tools are a necessary component of a broader set of 
policies to protect consumers from medical bill-related financial distress. 
By itself, however, price transparency is inherently limited as a consumer 
protection device.180 The first limit is that price transparency does not help 
 
 
 175.  Muir et al. supra note 151, at 319; Reinhardt, supra note 2, at 59. 
 176.  FRANCOIS DE BRANTES & SUZANNE DELBANCO, HEALTHCARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT 
INST. & CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM, REPORT CARD ON STATE PRICE TRANSPARENCY LAWS 6 
(2016).  
 177.  Id. at 5–6. Charge data are not useful because they do not reflect the prices that the majority 
of individuals with insurance would pay. David Dranove, The Rest of the Story About Hospital 
Pricing, THE HEALTH CARE BLOG (May 9, 2013), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2013/05/09/the-
rest-of-the-story-about-hospital-pricing/#more-61521; Muir et al., supra note 151, at 328. 
 178.  DE BRANTES & DELBANCO, supra note 176, at 6.  
 179.  See CO MEDICAL PRICE COMPARE, https://www.comedprice.org/#/home; COMPAREMAINE: 
HEALTH COSTS & QUALITY, http://www.comparemaine.org/; Health Costs for Consumer, N.H. 
HEALTHCOST, http://nhhealthcost.nh.gov/health-costs-consumers; OR. HOSP. GUIDE, 
http://oregonhospitalguide.org/.  
 180.  See, e.g., Austin Frakt, Price Transparency Is Nice. Just Don’t Expect it to Cut Health Care 
Costs, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/upshot/price-
transparency-is-nice-just-dont-expect-it-to-cut-health-costs.html. A secondary and possibly more 
important benefit of price transparency efforts by states is the importance of gathering comprehensive 
price and claims data to inform state oversight of health care markets, consolidation, prices, and 
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a consumer who lacks choices among in-network providers either due to 
market consolidation or narrow networks.181 Second, price transparency 
tools are only useful for “shoppable” services, which are non-urgent 
services that can be scheduled in advance for which there are several 
choices of provider.182 Unfortunately, much of health care is not 
shoppable, and patient-consumers cannot be expected to shop around in an 
emergency or when they or a loved one is gravely ill with complex 
medical needs.183  
A third limit of price transparency as a consumer protection is that 
recent broadening of ERISA preemption has significantly undercut the 
scope and breadth of data reported to state APCDs. As discussed in more 
depth in Part III, the Supreme Court held in Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual 
Insurance that ERISA preempts state APCD reporting laws with respect to 
self-funded employee health benefit plans,184 meaning that data from more 
than 60% of all individuals who are covered by an employer plan are no 
longer included in state APCDs or their consumer-facing transparency 
tools.185  
Finally, robust price transparency tools do not provide patients with 
firm price estimates, specific to their care and health coverage, that are 
binding or enforceable against the provider or plan.186 Some states require 
 
 
consumer choice. See Erin C. Fuse Brown & Jaime S. King, The Double-Edged Sword of Health Care 
Integration: Consolidation and Cost Control, 92 IND. L. J. 55, 81 (2016).  
 181.  See HA T. TU & JOHANNA R. LAUER, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, ISSUE 
BRIEF NO. 128, IMPACT OF HEALTH CARE PRICE TRANSPARENCY ON PRICE VARIATION: THE NEW 
HAMPSHIRE EXPERIENCE 1 (2009) (describing how New Hampshire’s robust price transparency tool 
has not led to reductions in prices or price variation in regions of the state with little competition in the 
hospital market). 
 182.  CHAPIN WHITE & MEGAN EGUCHI, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, RESEARCH 
BRIEF NO. 18, REFERENCE PRICING: A SMALL PIECE OF THE HEALTH CARE PRICES AND QUALITY 
PUZZLE 4 (2014) (“Using an inclusive definition, all shoppable services accounted for about a third of 
total spending if both inpatient and ambulatory services are included.”). 
 183.  Hall & Schneider, supra note 155, at 658.  
      184.    Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016). 
 185.  See Erin Fuse Brown & Jaime King, The Consequences of Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual for 
Health Care Cost Control, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 10, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/03/ 
10/the-consequences-of-gobeille-v-liberty-mutual-for-health-care-cost-control/. 
 186.  Of course, actual costs may vary if the severity or nature of the service is different than 
expected. But other industries and other health care settings (e.g., self-pay prices, elective, or non-
covered procedures) find ways to make price quotes both more reliable as well as flexible enough to 
deal with unexpected contingencies. See Wendy Netter Epstein, Price Transparency & Consumer 
Contracts in Health Care, at *42 (2017) [prepublication draft on file with author] (citing the Illinois 
Automotive Repair Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 306, as an example of a state law requiring written 
estimates for auto repair where the final bill may not be more than 10% above the estimate). Even in 
health care, price quotes are often provided for services that are typically not covered by insurance, 
such as LASIK eye surgery or fertility treatment. 
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health plans to provide prior estimates of the bill if the member requests 
one.187 In most cases, the estimates are nonbinding and, if they simply 
state the facility’s charges (which are several times higher than negotiated 
prices), do not help the patient understand what she will pay under her 
plan.188 For example, Texas health care facilities must provide upon 
request an estimate of total charges for nonemergency procedures, but the 
estimate also must state that actual charges may vary.189 
2. Site Neutral Payment 
Recommendations to reduce or eliminate facility fees and the site-of-
service differential in Medicare have been championed by the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), a nonpartisan legislative 
agency that advises Congress on Medicare payment policy.190 In its 2013 
and 2014 reports to Congress, MedPAC identified sixty-six Ambulatory 
Payment Classification (APC) groups of outpatient services191 that would 
be eligible for site-neutral payment, eliminating the higher payments to 
hospital outpatient departments.192 These services do not require 
emergency standby capacity, tend not to have higher patient complexity in 
hospital settings, and do not require additional overhead to provide in a 
hospital setting.193 MedPAC’s recommendation for site-neutral payments 
was based on its view that “if the same service can be safely provided in 
different settings, a prudent purchaser should not pay more for that service 
 
 
 187.  See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 3217-a(b)(14) (McKinney 2016) (“Each insurer . . . upon request 
of an insured, or prospective insured shall . . . with respect to out-of-network coverage, disclose the 
approximate dollar amount that the insurer will pay for a specific out-of-network health care service. 
The insurer shall also inform the insured through such disclosure that such approximation is not 
binding on the insurer and that the approximate dollar amount that the insurer will pay for a specific 
out-of-network health care service may change.”) (emphasis added). 
 188.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1339.585 (West 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
111, § 228 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 62J.81 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2075 (2016). 
 189.  See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 324.101(d) (2009).  
 190.  See generally MEDPAC 2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 158, at 27; MEDPAC 2014 
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 168, at 53.  
 191.  APC groups are Medicare’s unit of payment for outpatient services. The Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services assign all outpatient services to an APC group based on similar clinical 
characteristics and costs. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 4 (2016), 
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-
MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/HospitalOutpaysysfctsht.pdf.  
 192.  MEDPAC 2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 158, at 28; MEDPAC 2014 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 168, at 77.  
 193.  MEDPAC 2014 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 168, at 77.  
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in one setting than another.”194 MedPAC estimated that shifting to site-
neutral payments for these outpatient services would save the Medicare 
program $1.1 billion and beneficiaries $180 million in cost-sharing in one 
year.195 
In November 2015, Congress included a provision in the Bipartisan 
Budget Act of 2015 to implement site-neutral Medicare payments for 
outpatient services (other than emergency department services) furnished 
at any new, off-campus hospital outpatient departments.196 As of January 
1, 2017, outpatient services provided at new, off-campus hospital 
outpatient departments will be reimbursed at the same, lower rates as 
freestanding physicians’ offices.197 This site-neutral payment policy 
exempts: (1) grandfathered off-campus hospital outpatient departments 
that were billing as such prior to November 2, 2015,198 (2) emergency 
services performed by hospital outpatient departments,199 and (3) on-
campus hospital outpatient departments that are located in or within 250 
yards of a hospital or a remote location of the hospital.200 The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the Medicare site-neutral 
payment policy in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 will save $9.3 billion 
over ten years.201 
Supporters of site-neutral payment in Medicare included President 
Obama,202 the Government Accountability Office (GAO),203 congressional 
leaders from both parties,204 and a coalition representing primary care 
 
 
 194.  MEDPAC 2014 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 168, at 75. MedPAC further explained, 
“We believe that if patient severity is similar and a service can be provided in a lower cost setting 
without a reduction in quality or safety, Medicare should pay a rate based on the cost of the more 
efficient setting. If Medicare paid a higher rate to the less efficient setting, services would shift to 
being billed by the higher cost site of care, the cost of care could increase, and beneficiary costs would 
increase without any evidence that care would improve.” Id. at 77.  
 195.  Id. at 78.  
 196.  Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(21) (2012).  
 197.  Id. § 1395l(t)(1)(b)(v). 
 198.  Id. § 1395l(t)(21)(B)(ii).  
 199.  Id. § 1395l(t)(21)(A).  
 200.  Id. § 1395l(t)(21)(B)(i); 42 C.F.R. § 413.65(a)(2) (2017).  
 201.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATE OF THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF H.R. 1314, THE 
BIPARTISAN BUDGET ACT OF 2015, AS REPORTED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON RULES ON OCTOBER 
27, 2015, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/costestimate/hr1314.pdf.  
 202.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
(2016). 
 203.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICARE: INCREASING HOSPITAL-PHYSICIAN 
CONSOLIDATION HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR PAYMENT REFORM (2015). 
 204.  See Virgil Dickson, Congress Wants CMR to be Flexible in Final Site-Neutral Payment 
Rule, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20161006/NEWS/ 
161009938. 
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physicians, private health insurance carriers, and consumers.205 The GAO 
studied the issue and recommended Congress implement site-neutral 
payments in Medicare, concluding that Medicare is overpaying for 
services due to the site-of-service differential, which is inconsistent with 
its role as an “efficient purchaser of health care services.”206 The American 
Hospital Association, however, opposes site-neutral payment, which it 
says significantly affects hospitals’ future plans to form new hospital 
outpatient departments.207 Hospitals stand to lose the additional revenue 
generated by facility fees for services provided by acquired physician 
practices.   
Site-neutral payment in Medicare marks a significant step toward 
eliminating unwarranted payment differentials driving excess Medicare 
spending, but there remain limits on the extent to which it will prevent 
consumers from receiving bills for unwarranted facility fees. First, as 
noted above, the Balanced Budget Act’s site neutral payment policy does 
not apply to grandfathered hospital outpatient departments already in 
existence as of November 2015.208 Second, House leaders are still 
studying how broadly to interpret the site-neutral payment reforms.209 
Third, Medicare payment reforms may not be translated into changes for 
privately insured patients absent bargaining power from health plans to 
demand site-neutral payment from powerful health care provider systems 
or changes to state law.210  
 At the state-level, Connecticut has passed a law prohibiting hospitals 
from collecting a facility fee for outpatient office visits at an off-campus, 
 
 
 205.  See Letter from Alliance for Site Neutral Payment Reform to Senate Leadership (Jan. 16, 
2015), https://www.acponline.org/system/files/documents/advocacy/where_we_stand/assets/alliance_ 
site_neutral_payment_reform_senate_2015.pdf (advocating for site-neutral payment reform on behalf 
of the American College of Physicians, the Academy of Family Physicians, America’s Health 
Insurance Plans, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, among others). 
 206.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 203, at 16. 
 207.  Letter from Am. Hosp. Ass’n to Reps. Upton and Pitts (Feb. 12, 2016), 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwi02cuD9tz
NAhVLVD4KHWNZDLUQFgglMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aha.org%2Fadvocacy-
issues%2Fletter%2F2016%2F160212-let-sn.docx&usg=AFQjCNGD9GROqtD_5QTg20ek-iy46Fom-
A&sig2=CT7eJLNFujWfJiY1FMSXAg.  
 208.  See supra note 192–97 and accompanying text. 
 209.  Letter from Fred Upton, Chairman, and Frank Pallone, Jr., Ranking Member, House Comm. 
on Energy & Commerce, to Member of the Health Care Community (Feb. 5, 2016), 
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/114/Letters/201
60205SiteNeutralLetter%5B1%5D.pdf.  
 210.  See, e.g., John Carroll, Medicare Coverage Rules Are Not Always Last Word, MANAGED 
CARE (Oct. 2007), https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2007/10/medicare-coverage-rules-are-
not-always-last-word. 
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hospital-based facility.211 Although Connecticut’s facility fee ban only 
applies to “evaluation and management” codes used for office visits, not 
the full range of outpatient services covered by Medicare’s policy, 
Connecticut provides patients with more transparency and notice of 
facility fees for other types of outpatient services.212 For uninsured 
patients, providers may not charge more than the applicable Medicare rate 
for outpatient services received at an off-campus, hospital based facility, 
thereby incorporating any Medicare site-neutral payment changes into the 
amounts charged to uninsured patients.213 Connecticut also prohibits health 
plans from imposing a co-payment for a facility fee for outpatient office 
visits at an off-campus site of a hospital.214 Significantly for consumers, 
the Connecticut law makes a provider’s violation of these facility fee 
requirements an unfair trade practice, giving consumers a private remedy 
against providers in the event of noncompliance.215 In addition, it is an 
unfair trade practice for a provider in Connecticut to report a patient’s 
nonpayment of a prohibited surprise bill or facility fee to a credit reporting 
agency.216 
3. Gaps in Policies Addressing Opaque Prices and Facility Fees 
Even among states with the most robust price transparency 
requirements, none of the requirements rectify the fact that most health 
care is non-shoppable, that price estimates are non-binding, that quality is 
difficult to assess, and that consumers may lack choices of providers. Nor 
do the existing legal protections address the morass of confusion 
stemming from the complex interplay of multiple bills from multiple 
 
 
 211.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-508c(k) (Westlaw through May 16, 2017) (“Notwithstanding the 
provisions of this section, on and after January 1, 2017, no hospital, health system or hospital-based 
facility shall collect a facility fee for (1) outpatient health care services that use a current procedural 
terminology evaluation and management code and are provided at a hospital-based facility, other than 
a hospital emergency department, located off-site from a hospital campus, or (2) outpatient health care 
services, other than those provided in an emergency department located off-site from a hospital 
campus, received by a patient who is uninsured of more than the Medicare rate . . . . A violation of this 
subsection shall be considered an unfair trade practice pursuant to chapter 735a.”). 
 212.  Id. § 19a-508c(b)-(c), requiring hospitals to notify patients of facility fees, including an 
estimate of the amount of the fee, explanations on patient bills about facility fees. In addition, health 
facilities engaged in a transaction that will establish a hospital-based facility, such as the acquisition of 
a physician practice, must notify all patients served in the past three years about the transaction, likely 
resulting in added facility fees. Id. § 19a-508c(j).  
 213.  Id. § 19a-508c(k). 
 214.  Id. § 19a-508c(b).  
 215.  Id. § 19a-508c(k). 
 216.  Id. § 20-7f.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION IN HEALTH CARE 167 
 
 
 
 
providers (à la carte billing), facility fees, and the complicating element of 
insurance with its attendant in-network/out-of-network/cost-sharing 
calculations. Patients need a unified, understandable, itemized bill that 
clearly states how much they owe, and they need to be able to rely upon 
reasonable price quotes among meaningful choices provided in advance of 
receiving the care. But because patients are not typically in a position to 
exercise consumer-type shopping or negotiation (whether due to medical 
duress, lack of choices, or complexity), patients need more than disclosure 
of prices or added facility fees—they need regulatory protection from 
extreme price variation or added facility fees.  
C. Medical Debt Collection and Reporting  
Medical debts are widespread. The CFPB reported that 52% of all 
debts on credit reports were medical debts, by far the most common type 
of debt.217 Medical debts are also different than other types of debt—
consumers are often unaware of their medical debts or they are struggling 
to get the bills resolved with the providers and payer.218  
The problem of confusing and unanticipated medical bills is 
exacerbated for consumers when unpaid medical bills are sold to debt 
collectors and reported to credit reporting agencies. When a patient fails to 
pay a medical bill, the providers often sell the debt to collectors within 90-
120 days,219 even if the reason the patient has not paid is because he is 
unaware of the bill or is in the process of disputing billing errors or 
verifying how much he owes.220 This happened to Gene Cavallo, who was 
negotiating with the hospital over a $110,000 surgery bill, when the 
hospital sold his unpaid bill to a collection agency, which damaged his 
credit and negatively affected his business.221 In a 2014 survey, of adults 
aged nineteen to sixty-four who reported having trouble with medical bills 
or debt, 41% (or approximately fourteen million people) reported lower 
 
 
 217.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS: A STUDY OF MEDICAL AND 
NON-MEDICAL COLLECTIONS 4 (2014). 
 218.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, DATA POINT: MEDICAL DEBT & CREDIT SCORES 3 (2014). 
 219.  Self Pay Account Referrals, THE RECEIVABLES REPORT FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE 
FINANCIAL MANAGERS, Nov. 2013, at 11 (reporting that in 2013, 48% of hospitals turned over self-
pay accounts to collection agencies between 91–120 days, and 40% of hospitals did so between 121–
180 days). 
 220.  Elisabeth Rosenthal, When Health Costs Harm Your Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2014, 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/sunday-review/when-health-costs-harm-your-credit. 
html. 
 221.  Id. 
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credit ratings as a result.222 Lower credit scores have a tangible impact on 
an individual’s financial well-being, affecting the ability to secure a 
mortgage or subjecting a person to higher interest rates for consumer 
credit.223  
Beyond reporting debts to credit rating agencies, health care providers 
and their debt collectors may also pursue a range of extraordinary 
collection actions to recover the debts, including lawsuits to garnish a 
patient’s wages or to foreclose upon or place a lien on the patient’s 
home.224 A 2015 study of nonprofit, tax-exempt hospitals reported that as 
recently as 2012, 20% of these hospitals were using extraordinary 
collection actions against patients.225 Media accounts suggest that the use 
of debt collection tactics varies by hospital and by the collection agency to 
which the provider sells the debt.226 A single hospital could be responsible 
for hundreds or even thousands of lawsuits against patients for unpaid 
medical bills.227  
 
 
 222.  SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, TOO HIGH A PRICE: OUT-OF-POCKET 
HEALTH CARE COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES exhibit 5 (Nov. 13, 2014), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2014/nov/out-of-pocket-health-care-
costs. 
 223.  Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Study Finds Medical Debt Overly 
Penalizes Consumer Credit Scores (May 20, 2014), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-medical-debt-overly-penalizes-consumer-credit-scores/. 
 224.  Other extraordinary collection actions include requiring up-front payment before providing 
additional care and even seeking arrest for failing to appear in court for a debt collection hearing. 26 
C.F.R. § 1.501(r)-6(b)(2017) (defining what constitutes “extraordinary collection actions” by tax-
exempt hospitals). See also Erin C. Fuse Brown, Fair Hospital Prices Are Not Charity: Decoupling 
Hospital Pricing and Collection Rules from Tax Status, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 509, 519 (2016). 
 225.  Sayeh S. Nikpay & John Z. Ayanian, Hospital Charity Care—Effects of New Community-
Benefit Requirements, 373 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1687, 1689 (2015).  
 226.  Chris Arnold & Paul Kiel, When Nonprofit Hospitals Sue Their Poorest Patients, NPR 
(Dec. 19, 2014) (reporting that in Missouri, Heartland hospital filed 2200 debt-collection lawsuits 
against patients in 2013, while BJC Healthcare filed only twenty-six); Thomas Gounley, From Patient 
to Defendant: One of Springfield’s Two Health Systems Sues Far More Over Debt, SPRINGFIELD 
NEWS-LEADER (April 2, 2015), http://www.news-leader.com/story/news/local/ozarks/2015/04/02/ 
patient-defendant-one-springfields-two-health-systems-sues-far-debt/70830566/ (reporting that of the 
750 medical debt collection suits against patients filed in Greene County, Missouri in 2013, 701 were 
by Cox Health or its debt collector, while forty were filed by Mercy or its collector).  
 227.  Ames Alexander & David Raynor, Charlotte Hospital System Sues Thousands of Patients, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 24, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/special-
reports/prognosis-profits/article16924670.html (reporting that North Carolina hospitals had filed 
40,000 debt collection suits against patients over the prior five-year period, with 12,000 of these suits 
filed by Carolinas HealthCare System). Due to the unfavorable press coverage as well as increased 
compliance with the legal reforms, some of the hospitals identified in high-profile news stories have 
curtailed their debt collection lawsuit activities. See Ames Alexander & David Raynor, Hospitals Curb 
Patient Lawsuits, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 21, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.charlotte 
observer.com/news/local/article10885310.html; Chris Arnold & Paul Kiel, Nonprofit Hospital 
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This section evaluates three types of legal reforms aimed at protecting 
patients from the financial ramifications of medical debt collection and 
reporting: (1) the IRS rules for tax-exempt hospitals, (2) state medical debt 
collection laws, and (3) reforms led by the federal CFPB on how medical 
debt is treated in consumer credit reports.  
1. IRS Rules for Tax-Exempt Hospitals 
The ACA set forth financial protections for patients who receive care at 
federally tax-exempt hospitals, implemented by the IRS.228 Among other 
provisions, these requirements prescribe financial assistance as well as fair 
billing and collection requirements for federally tax-exempt hospitals.  
First, such hospitals must maintain and widely publicize a written 
financial assistance policy that sets forth eligibility criteria for free or 
discounted care as well as how charges to patients are calculated.229 The 
IRS rules, however, do not prescribe how hospitals must determine 
eligibility for financial assistance, leaving these determinations to the 
hospitals’ discretion.230  
Second, hospitals must limit the amounts charged to patients who are 
eligible for financial assistance to “amounts generally billed” (AGB) to 
insured patients for emergency or medically necessary care.231 Hospitals 
may not charge such patients “gross charges,” which are the hospitals’ 
full, undiscounted rates.232  
Third, the IRS rules limit nonprofit hospitals’ ability to engage in 
aggressive debt-collection practices to recover unpaid bills from 
 
 
Forgives Debts and Stops Suing So Many Poor Patients, NPR (June 2, 2016, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/06/02/480192982/nonprofit-hospital-forgives-debts-and-stops-suing-so-
many-poor-patients.  
 228.  26 U.S.C. § 501(r). These requirements were not altered by the Republican bill to repeal and 
replace the ACA, which was proposed in March 2017. See American Health Care Act, H.R. 1628, 
115th Cong. (2017). 
 229.  26 U.S.C. § 501(r)(4) (2012); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)-4(b)(5) (2017). 
 230.  See Fuse Brown, supra note 224, at 529–30.   
 231.  26 U.S.C. § 501(r)(5) (2012); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)-5(b) (2017). There are three alternate 
methods of calculating AGB. First, AGB can be calculated as the amount that would be paid by 
Medicare, including Medicare beneficiary co-insurance. Second, AGB can be calculated by taking into 
account the amounts that are paid by both Medicare and private insurers. Third, AGB can be based on 
the amounts paid by Medicaid, either alone or in combination with the rates paid by Medicare and 
private insurers. Id. § 1.501(r)-5(b)(3)(ii). 
 232.  26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)-(1)(16) (2017) (defining “gross charges” as the chargemaster rate, a 
hospital facility’s full, established price for medical care that the hospital facility consistently and 
uniformly charges patients before applying any contractual allowances, discounts, or deductions).  
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patients.233 Hospitals may not use “extraordinary collection actions” unless 
the hospital has made reasonable efforts to determine whether the patient 
is eligible for financial assistance.234 “Extraordinary collection actions” 
include: placing a lien on an individual’s property, foreclosing on an 
individual’s real property, attaching or seizing an individual’s bank 
account or any other personal property, commencing a civil action against 
an individual; causing an individual’s arrest, causing an individual to be 
subject to a writ of body attachment; garnishing an individual’s wages, 
reporting an individual to a credit agency, selling an individual’s debt to 
another party, or requiring payment of a prior debt before providing 
medically necessary care.235 To have made “reasonable efforts,” a hospital 
must determine whether an individual is eligible for financial assistance or 
provide notice about the availability of financial assistance within 120 
days after the date of the first bill.236 Notably, these rules do not prohibit 
hospitals from using extraordinary collection actions after determining 
eligibility for financial assistance or making the required notification.  
 The IRS rules for tax-exempt hospitals create important financial 
protections, particularly for low-income patients, by reducing the amount 
of their hospital bills and limiting the use of collection tactics to recover 
unpaid bills. There are, however, significant limits to the rules’ 
protections. The rules do not cover for-profit or government-run hospitals, 
which make up about 40% of all hospitals.237 In addition, the rules leave a 
lot to the hospital’s discretion, particularly eligibility for financial 
assistance from which all the other protections flow.238 Finally, the rules 
do not apply to physician practices or other types of providers that tend to 
be for-profit, so the rules do not prevent surprise billing or aggressive debt 
collection practices by these providers.239  
 
 
 233.  26 U.S.C. § 501(r)(6) (2012); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)–6(a) (2017).  
 234.  26 U.S.C. § 501(r)(6) (2012); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)–6(a) (2017). 
 235.  26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)–6(b)(1) (2017). 
 236.  Id. § 1.501(r)-6(c). The final rules clarify that the 120-day clock starts on the date of the first 
bill post-discharge. In addition, the rules require the hospital to process any financial assistance 
application submitted within 240 days after the post-discharge bill. Additional Requirements for 
Charitable Hospitals, 79 Fed. Reg. 78,954, 78,986–87 (Internal Revenue Serv. Dec. 31, 2014).  
 237.  Hospitals by Ownership Type, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-
indicator/hospitals-by-ownership/ (setting forth data for 2015 and before).  
 238.  Erin C. Fuse Brown, IRS Rules Will Not Stop Unfair Hospital Billing and Collection 
Practices, 17 AMA J. ETHICS 763, 764 (2015).  
 239.  See, e.g., Samantha Liss, When a Nonprofit Health System Outsources its ER, Debt 
Collectors Follow, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 17, 2016, available at 
http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/when-a-nonprofit-health-system-outsources-its-er-debt-
collectors/article_826b26bf-0c85-5ae4-9af1-a1f9f9591539.html (reporting over 1000 lawsuits filed by 
debt collector for a for-profit contractor operating at a nonprofit hospital’s ER). 
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2. State Medical Debt Collection Laws 
In addition to the federal limits on medical debt collection by tax-
exempt hospitals, several states have enacted limits on medical debt 
collection, many of which apply to both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. 
At least sixteen states240 have laws that restrict hospital debt collection 
practices, including: limitations on interest rates hospitals may charge on 
medical debt,241 limits on hospitals’ ability to foreclose or place a lien on a 
patient’s home or other property,242 limits on wage garnishment,243 
obligations to offer payment plans,244 and requirements for the timing and 
 
 
 240.  These states include California, Connecticut, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Rhode Island, and Washington. See Hospital Community Benefit Program: Community Benefit State 
Law Profiles Comparison, HILLTOP INSTITUTE, http://www.hilltopinstitute.org/HCBP_CBL_state_ 
table.cfm (last visited Sept. 30, 2016).  
 241.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 127425(g) (West 2012) (requiring hospitals’ extended 
payment plans to be interest free); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. §19-214-1(b) (West 2017); MD. 
CODE REGS. 10.37.10.26A-2(2)(a) (2017) (prohibiting interest for self-pay patients absent court order); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-01-14.1 (2017) (limiting interest rates to 1% per month, finance charges to 
twenty-five dollars per month). See Fuse Brown, supra note 224, at 546 n.192. 
 242.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 127425(f) (WEST 2012) (prohibiting liens upon or sale of 
patient’s primary residence where patient is eligible for discounted or charity care); LA. STAT. ANN. § 
20:1(A)(2) (2009) (exempting a patient’s homestead from seizure and sale for debts due to 
“catastrophic or terminal illness or injury”); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 19-214.2 (West 2017); 
MD. CODE REGS. 10.37.10.26 (2017) (prohibiting hospitals from forcing the sale or foreclosure of 
patient’s primary residence, but permitting liens on such residence); 114.6 MASS. CODE REGS. 
12.08(1)(b) (2017) (prohibiting legal execution against patient’s residence or motor vehicle without 
approval of hospital Board of Trustees); NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.095 (2017) (prohibiting legal execution 
of debtor’s primary residence for medical debt while occupied); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §2807-k(9-
a)(h) (2017) (prohibiting forced sale or foreclosure of a patient’s primary residence to collect an 
outstanding medical debt if patient is eligible for financial aid); N.C. GEN. STAT. §131E-91(d)(5)-(6) 
(2013) (prohibiting liens upon or forced sale of the principal residence of the patient-debtor, or the 
custodial parent of a minor patient); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A)(1)(a) (West 2017) 
(exempting a person’s residence from execution, garnishment, attachment, or sale to satisfy a medical 
debt until the property is sold or transferred); 31-4-9 R.I. CODE R. § 11.0 (allowing hospitals to attach 
but not foreclose upon a patient’s primary residence for non-payment of debts). See Fuse Brown, supra 
note 224, at 546 n.193.  
 243.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 127425(f) (WEST 2012) (prohibiting wage garnishment by 
hospitals and collection agencies, except by court order); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2310(c) (West 2017) 
(prohibiting wage garnishment until two months after recovery from an illness that prevented work for 
more than two weeks and limiting the amount of wages that can be garnished). See Fuse Brown, supra 
note 224, at 546 n.194. 
 244.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 127425(e) (WEST 2012) (prohibiting sending unpaid bills 
to collection agency while a patient is negotiating a payment plan or making regular payments of a 
reasonable amount, unless assignee agrees to comply with all fair collections requirements); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 25-3-112(4)(a) (2013) (requiring hospitals to offer a reasonable payment plan before 
seeking collection); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 88/30 (2013) (requiring hospitals to offer a payment plan 
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procedure for assigning medical debt to a collection agency.245 The scope 
of these limits on collection practices varies, with some states applying 
them broadly, and others limiting the protections by the patient’s income 
or uninsured status.  
3. CFPB Activity on Medical Debts 
Additional federal oversight over the collection and reporting of 
medical debt comes from CFPB, an independent federal agency created by 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 (Dodd-
Frank).246 CFPB has statutory authority to regulate unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts or practices of any person or their affiliate who offers a 
“consumer financial product or service.”247 Additionally, Dodd-Frank 
authorizes CFPB to issue implementing rules and enforce a variety of 
federal financial protection statutes, including, among others, the Fair 
 
 
before pursuing collection); MD. CODE REGS. 10.37.10.26(A-2)(2)(a) (West 2017) (requiring hospitals 
to offer a payment plan to uninsured patients with incomes from 200–500% of the federal poverty 
level (FPL)). N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §2807-k(9-a) (d) (2017) (requiring hospitals to offer monthly 
installment plans, where payments may not exceed 10% of patient’s gross monthly income).  
 245.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 127425(d) (West 2012) (prohibiting hospitals or collection 
agencies from reporting to credit agencies or commencing civil action until after 150 days after initial 
bill); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-112(4) (2013) (allowing a thirty-day grace period after due date for first 
scheduled payment before initiating collection); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-673, 19a-673b (2013) 
(prohibiting collections until hospital determines that the patient’s income exceeds 250% of FPL and 
patient is not eligible for Medicare or Medicaid); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 88/30, 88/35 (2013) 
(permitting hospital to seek collection against an uninsured patient only after allowing the patient to 
assess the accuracy of bill, apply for financial assistance, and avail themselves of payment plan, and 
prohibiting collection against uninsured patients who demonstrate they lack financial means to pay); 
MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 19-214.2 (2017) (prohibiting sale of debt by hospitals); N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE §10:52-11.14 (2014) (prohibiting hospitals from billing or initiating collection procedures 
against persons determined to be eligible for charity care or reduced charge charity care); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §131E-91(d) (2013) (prohibiting hospitals and ambulatory surgical facilities from referring 
unpaid bills to collections agency while patient is applying for financial assistance and requiring thirty 
days’ prior written notice before referral for collection); WASH. REV. CODE §70.170.060(6) (1998); 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE 246-453-020(1) (1991) (prohibiting collection until hospital determines whether 
the patient has insurance or is eligible for free or discounted care). See Fuse Brown, supra note 224, at 
547 n.195. 
 246.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, tit.X (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). 
 247.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, §1002(5); 12 U.S.C. § 5481(5) (2012) (“Consumer financial products or service[s]” are defined to 
include financial products or services that are offered or provided for use by consumers primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes. It is also defined to include certain financial products or 
services that are delivered, offered, or provided in connection with a consumer financial product—
specifically, those related to extending credit and loan servicing, real estate settlement services, 
consumer reporting, and debt collection.). 
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Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA).248 The Trump administration has been critical of Dodd-Frank and 
has pledged to work with Republicans in Congress to repeal the law, 
including those provisions that provide authority to CFPB.249  
CFPB’s regulatory authority over medical debt remains somewhat 
ambiguous. Medical debt may not constitute a “consumer financial 
product or service” under Dodd-Frank unless it arises from the extension 
of credit, such as a deferred payment plan.250 This means that Dodd-
Frank’s restrictions on unfair or abusive financial practices may not cover 
health care providers who bill a patient for unpaid fees for the providers’ 
own services if they have not granted the patient a right to defer payment. 
Until the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010, the FDCPA did not cover first-
party collectors (i.e., the creditor seeking payment of a debt for itself), but 
Dodd-Frank amended FDCPA to authorize CFPB to regulate first-party 
collectors in addition to third-party collectors.251  
In a 2013 Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CFPB requested 
information and comments on whether and how it should regulate first-
party collectors and how it should treat medical debts.252 CFPB has not 
issued final rules on whether and to what extent it will regulate medical 
billing and debt collection by providers as first-party collectors. CFPB 
asserted its authority to enforce the FDCPA against the debt collection 
agencies and credit reporting agencies that collect and report on medical 
debts on behalf of the provider—the third-party collectors.253 In other 
 
 
 248.  Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 814(d) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(d), as amended 
by Dodd-Frank Act § 1089). 
 249.  See, e.g., Marilyn Geewax, Trump Team Promises to ‘Dismantle’ Dodd-Frank Bank 
Regulations, NPR (Nov. 10, 2016, 4:48 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/11/10/501610842/trump-team-promises-to-dismantle-dodd-frank-bank-regulations. 
 250.  Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Debt Collection Market, 77 Fed. Reg. 65775, 
65779 (Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Oct. 31, 2012). 
 251.  Debt Collection, 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67853 (Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau proposed Nov. 
12, 2013) (“[T]he Bureau believes it is important to examine whether rules covering the conduct of 
creditors collecting in their own names on their own debts that arise out of consumer credit 
transactions are warranted. As discussed above, Congress excluded such creditors from the FDCPA in 
1977, but it gave the Bureau authority under the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 to prescribe rules applicable 
to creditors.”). 
 252.  78 Fed. Reg. at 67854. 
 253.  Id. CFPB stated: 
Some debt collection that is subject to the FDCPA may not be subject to the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s prohibition against unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices and thus could be 
addressed in a proposed FDCPA rule but not a proposed Dodd-Frank Act rule. For example, 
in its Larger Participant Rule, the Bureau noted that some medical debt (i.e. that which did 
not arise from an extension of credit within the meaning of the Dodd-Frank Act), might not 
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words, once the medical debt is in the hands of the third-party debt 
collector, it enters CFPB’s supervisory scope.  
Despite ambiguity about the extent of CFPB’s authority over first-party 
medical billing and collection efforts by providers, CFPB has been quite 
active in the areas of medical debt collection by third-party collectors. In 
June 2015, CFPB entered a consent order against Syndicated Office 
Systems, LLC, a medical collection firm, for violations of the FDCPA and 
FCRA.254 Syndicated is an indirect subsidiary of Conifer Health Solutions, 
LLC, a health care billing services company owned by for-profit hospital 
giant, Tenet Healthcare Corporation.255 Syndicated allegedly violated the 
FCRA by failing to respond to over 13,000 consumer credit reporting 
disputes and allegedly violated the FDCPA by failing to send required 
debt validation notices to over 10,000 consumers while it pursued 
collections from these consumers.256 CFPB ordered the company to pay 
$5.4 million in relief to affected consumers, rectify its collection and 
reporting practices, and to pay a $500,000 penalty.257 The order against 
Syndicated was the first enforcement action that the CPFB has taken 
against a medical debt collector under its authority to enforce the FDCPA 
and FCRA and confirms CFPB’s assertion of authority over medical debt 
collection agencies. 
In addition, CFPB has taken steps to address the treatment of medical 
debt on consumer credit reports. CFPB published two reports in 2014 
detailing the results from its study of the treatment of medical debt on 
credit reports.258 The 2014 reports highlighted several findings: medical 
 
 
involve a consumer financial product or service. Id. 
See Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Debt Collection Model, 77 Fed. Reg. at 65780 
(“[I]n supervising a larger participant of the consumer debt collection market, the Bureau will examine 
the entity’s collection of medical debt along with other activities subject to the FDCPA and other 
Federal consumer financial law.”) In an accompanying footnote, CFPB noted it “has the authority to 
examine an entity’s compliance with Federal consumer financial law, beyond the activities that 
rendered the entity subject to supervision.” Id. at 65,780 n.47. 
 254.  Consent Order, In re Syndicated Office Sys., LLC, File No. 2015-CFPB-0012 (Jun. 18, 
2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201506_cfpb_order-syndicated.pdf.  
 255.  Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against Medical Debt 
Collector (June 18, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-
against-medical-debt-collector/.  
 256.  See Consent Order, In re Syndicated Office Sys., LLC, File No.-2015-CFPB-0012, at 5–6.  
 257.  See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against Medical Debt 
Collector (June 18, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-
against-medical-debt-collector/. 
 258.  KENNETH P. BREVOORT & MICHELLE KAMBARA, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, DATA 
POINT: MEDICAL DEBT & CREDIT SCORES (2014) [hereinafter CFPB MAY 2014 REPORT], 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/data-point-medical-debt-and-credit-
scores/; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS: A STUDY OF MEDICAL AND 
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debt was the most common type of debt appearing on credit reports, 
making up over half of all collections on consumer credit reports;259 
medical debt is different than other types of debt in that consumers are 
often unaware of the debt or are in the process of disputing or verifying 
the amount they owe when the debts are reported;260 and as a result, 
medical debts tend to be overly penalized in the calculation of credit 
scores by underestimating the creditworthiness of those consumers with 
medical debts as compared with other debts.261  
Although the CFPB did not promulgate regulations on the issue, its 
2014 reports paved the way to two important industry changes for the 
treatment of medical debt on consumer credit reports. The first was a 
voluntary move by FICO in 2014 to weigh medical debts less than 
nonmedical debts in calculating an individual’s credit score and to 
disregard all paid medical collection accounts.262 The second industry 
change stems from a 2015 settlement agreement between the three major 
credit reporting agencies with New York Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman, effectuating nationwide changes in credit reporting 
practices.263 Specifically, the credit reporting agencies agreed to refrain 
from reporting medical debts on credit reports until 180 days delinquent, 
in order to allow for insurance payment, resolutions of disputes, and 
determinations by the consumer of how much he owes. 264 Second, credit 
reporting agencies agreed to remove from credit reports all debts that were 
paid in full or are being paid by insurance.265 The medical debt provisions 
of the settlement must be fully implemented by June 6, 2018,266 and are 
 
 
NON-MEDICAL COLLECTIONS (2014) [hereinafter CFPB DEC. 2014 REPORT], 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/consumer-credit-reports-a-study-of-
medical-and-non-medical-collections/.  
 259.  CFPB DEC. 2014 REPORT, supra note 258, at 19, 21 (noting that 52% of all collection 
“tradelines” on credit reports were medical debts and appeared on 19% of all consumers’ credit 
reports).  
 260.  CFPB MAY 2014 REPORT, supra note 258, at 3; CFPB DEC. 2014 REPORT, supra note 258, 
at 36, 40–41. 
 261.  CFPB MAY 2014 REPORT, supra note 258, at 5–6.  
 262.  CFPB Dec. 2014 Report, supra note 258, at 52; Ethan Dornhelm, The Impact of Medical 
Debt on FICO® Scores, FICO BLOG (July 13, 2015), http://www.fico.com/en/blogs/risk-
compliance/impact-medical-debt-fico-scores/.  
 263.  Settlement Agreement, In re Investigation of Experian Info. Sols., et al., (Mar. 8, 2015), 
https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/CRA%20Agreement%20Fully%20Executed%203.8.15.pdf (settlement agree-
ment). 
 264.  Id. at 13–14.  
 265.  Id. 
 266.  The settlement must be implemented by the “Completion Date,” which is three years and 
ninety days from March 8, 2015, the date the settlement went into effect. Id. at 9, 11, exhibit A.   
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generally consistent with FICO’s changes to its scoring methodology. The 
practical effect of the new practice of removing paid medical debts from 
credit reports, according to one estimate, is that consumers whose only 
reported debt was medical debt will see their FICO score (which ranges 
from 300-800) increase by twenty-five points.267 
 The upshot of CFPB’s efforts to date, as augmented by the New York 
Attorney General and FICO, is a nationwide change to the ways medical 
debts can be reported to consumer credit agencies and factored into credit 
score calculations. Consumers will be protected from reductions in their 
credit ratings as a result of medical bills that have been paid or are being 
disputed or clarified with insurance providers, and standalone medical 
debts will not damage an individual’s credit score to the same extent as 
before the changes. Moreover, consumers are more likely to know about 
medical debt reported to credit reporting agencies and more able to rectify 
errors on credit reports relating to medical debts.   
4. Gaps in Policies Addressing Medical Debt Collection 
The gaps in protections addressing medical debt collection and 
reporting practices stem from limits in their scope and applicability. First, 
the IRS rules only apply to tax-exempt hospitals, not for-profit hospitals, 
physicians, or other types of providers.268 Second, some states fill this gap 
to a limited extent by imposing restrictions on medical debt collection by 
all hospitals or other types of providers regardless of tax status, but this is 
not the majority of states, nor do most state laws reach the debt collection 
or reporting activities of physicians.269  
On credit reporting, however, there has been a national reform to credit 
scoring practices stemming from the CFPB’s studies, voluntary action by 
FICO in adjusting the weight of medical debt in credit score calculations, 
and the New York Attorney General’s settlement with the three major 
credit reporting firms.270 These reforms provide consumers across the 
country with significant protection from unwarranted damage to credit 
scores from medical debts.  
 
 
 
 267.  Gregory Karp, Credit Bureaus to Offer Relief to Consumers with Medical Debt, CHI. TRIB. 
(Mar. 9, 2015, 1:42 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-credit-reports-0310-biz-
20150309-story.html. 
 268.  See supra note 237 and accompanying text. See also Fuse Brown, supra note 224, at 527–
29.  
 269.  See supra notes 240–45 and accompanying text.  
 270.  See supra notes 258–67 and accompanying text. 
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II. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION IN HEALTH CARE 
Given the strengths and limitations of existing laws described in Part I, 
this Part sets forth a menu of model policies for consumer financial 
protection in health care. Many of these policies are modeled upon and 
extend beyond recent state legislation to protect health care consumers, 
including presumptively binding health care price estimates, regulatory 
caps on out-of-network rates, elimination of unwarranted facility fees for 
state and private payers, and private remedies under state unfair trade 
practice laws.  
A. Model Policy to Address Surprise Medical Bills 
To address the problem of surprise medical bills, a model policy would 
build off the strengths of the state innovations in this area. Similar to 
several states with surprise billing provisions and the NAIC Model Act, 
any comprehensive measure should prohibit surprise billing for covered 
emergency services (whether in- or out-of-network) and medically 
necessary services at in-network facilities where the patient was not 
provided a meaningful option to receive care from an in-network 
provider.271 The requirement of notice is built into the prohibition on 
surprise billing because a patient would only be obligated to pay additional 
cost-sharing or balance bill amounts if the patient affirmatively chooses 
the out-of-network provider over meaningful in-network options, and 
when the patient is fully informed of the financial ramifications of 
choosing a particular out-of-network provider. To be meaningful, the 
patient would have to be notified that they will be receiving care from an 
out-of-network provider far enough ahead of time (e.g., twenty-four hours 
or more) to allow the patient to request a different provider and be alerted 
to whether any in-network provider alternatives exist, and such advance 
notice would only be possible in non-emergencies. If choosing an in-
network alternative would delay the patient’s receipt of care by more than 
twenty-four hours, such alternative would not be considered meaningful. If 
there is an exception for out-of-network charges to which the patient has 
voluntarily consented, such consent should be accompanied by a 
 
 
 271.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9; CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8 (2016); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. 38a-477aa; N.Y. INS. LAW § 3241(c) (2014); N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 6 (McKinney 
2016); FLA. STAT. § 627.64194.  
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presumptively binding estimate of what the patient should expect to pay.272 
Second, a model surprise billing law should solve the problem of how 
much a non-participating or out-of-network provider ought to be paid by 
payers for the service. Leaving it indeterminate (i.e., the provider’s “usual, 
customary, and reasonable rates” or whatever rate upon which the health 
plan and provider may agree) invites expensive litigation.273 Two options 
include legislating a rate cap, as California has done, calculated as a 
percentage of Medicare or benchmarked rates,274 or using binding, 
independent dispute resolution mechanism, like New York’s law.275 
Whether rate caps or dispute resolution are used to determine rates, the 
policy must strike a balance—if health plans have unilateral control to 
determine out-of-network prices, the measure will be politically and 
financially intolerable for providers, but if providers are allowed to bill 
full or close-to-full charges, the higher prices may perpetuate providers’ 
incentives to remain out-of-network and raise the costs of care for health 
plans, which in turn drives up premiums for consumers.276 Thus, 
California’s approach of statutorily defining or capping out-of-network 
rates may be simpler to administer, but the legislature (or regulatory 
agency) must take care to define the maximum rates at a level that is 
neither too low for providers nor too high for plans.  
Third, patients should have a private remedy against providers for 
violations of the surprise billing prohibitions. The model for this is 
Connecticut’s law, which designates providers’ violations of the surprise 
billing prohibition an unfair trade practice.277 Although administrative 
enforcement may provide a significant deterrent to most surprise billing 
practices, a private remedy with punitive damages and attorneys’ fees 
provides patients with direct recourse for violations of the requirements 
that may be too small to be enforced otherwise. For example, a surprise 
bill of $1500 may be financially significant to a patient, but without 
punitive or treble damages and attorneys’ fees, the figure is too small for a 
legal aid attorney to take on the patient’s case and perhaps too 
insignificant for the state attorney general’s office to pursue. 
Fourth, all out-of-pocket payments for involuntary out-of-network bills 
 
 
 272.  For a description of the types of situations that could overcome the presumption that the 
written cost estimate is binding, see infra Part II.B.  
 273.  See Lucas & Williams, supra note 51, at 138.  
 274.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.31; Cal. Ins. Code § 10112.82 (capping out-of-
network rates at the greater of 125% of Medicare or the average in-network price paid by the plan for 
the service).  
 275.  N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW §§ 605, 607 (McKinney 2016).  
 276.  HALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 20.  
 277.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-7f.  
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should count toward a patient’s out-of-pocket limit and in-network 
deductible. Even if surprise balance-billing is prohibited and cost-sharing 
amounts are equivalent to in-network rates, patients will end up paying 
more for involuntary out-of-network cost-sharing if those amounts do not 
count toward the annual out-of-pocket limit or are credited against a 
higher out-of-network deductible rather than an in-network deductible. An 
example is California’s law, which requires all cost-sharing for out-of-
network providers in an emergency or at in-network facilities to be treated 
for all purposes as in-network cost-sharing.278 
Finally, the provider should be prohibited from reporting or initiating 
collection on unpaid bills that exceed the patient’s in-network cost-sharing 
amount.279 To the extent that a patient erroneously receives a surprise 
medical bill, the patient should be assured that they will not suffer the 
negative financial consequences from having the bill reported to credit 
agencies or sold to a debt collector while the patient and/or the health plan 
disputes the bill.280  
B. Model Policy to Address Opaque Prices and Facility Fees 
The model policy to address the opacity of medical bills is to establish 
a price and quality transparency tool and require providers to provide 
presumptively binding, written cost estimates to patients. To overcome the 
presumption that the estimate is binding, the provider would have to show, 
for example, that the nature or extent of the diagnosis and service required 
or the patient’s health plan were materially different than those on which 
the cost-estimate was provided.  
Examples of robust price and quality transparency tools for consumers 
are New Hampshire’s HealthCost, Maine’s CompareMaine, and 
Colorado’s Medical Price Compare websites.281 These websites use data 
from state all-payer claims databases to provide consumers with tools to 
compare the prices for specific services across providers. To be 
meaningful to consumers, the prices should be the amounts paid by payers, 
including the insurance reimbursement and the patient’s cost-sharing, not 
 
 
 278.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(b) (2016); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8(b) (2016). 
 279.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(c)(2)); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8(c)(2). 
 280.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(e); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8(e); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 20-7f(c). For a description of the negative consequences of medical debt collection and 
reporting practices for patients, see supra notes 203–211 and accompanying text.  
 281.  N.H. HEALTHCOST, supra note 179; COMPAREMAINE: HEALTH COSTS & QUALITY, supra 
note 179; CO MEDICAL PRICE COMPARE, supra note 179. At this time, CO Medical Price Compare is 
limited to information on childbirth, knee replacement, and hip replacement services. Id. 
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the provider’s charges, which often are much higher than the negotiated 
discounted rates billed to health insurance companies.  
The searchable consumer websites populated by a robust data source 
(an all payer claims database) are considered more helpful than bare legal 
requirements for providers to disclose prices upon request. 282 Because 
search costs are high, the ideal price transparency tool is the searchable 
state-wide comparison website, supplemented by a legal requirement that 
prices posted on such websites are presumptively binding on providers 
(hospitals, physicians, outpatient clinics, etc.).  
The second model policy would establish site neutral payments for all 
payers, public and private, for all non-emergency outpatient services that 
do not require additional standby capacity.283 Medicare is moving in this 
direction, but states can legislate to extend this payment policy to private 
payers and Medicaid.284 The Connecticut law is a model, but an 
incomplete one because it only eliminates facility fees for office visits, not 
the broader range of outpatient services identified by MedPAC as eligible 
for site-neutral payment.285 Eliminating unwarranted facility fees for all 
payers is a highly contentious and politically difficult policy. Connecticut 
legislators originally planned a broader implementation of site-neutral 
payment, but narrowed the requirement after facing stiff opposition from 
powerful hospital facilities and physician groups in the state.286 
Connecticut’s law on facility fees287 also set forth a model for 
enforcement by making a provider’s violations of the facility fee 
prohibitions an unfair trade practice under the state’s law prohibiting 
“unfair and deceptive acts or practices” or UDAP statute.288 This provides 
 
 
 282.  DE BRANTES & DELBANCO, supra note 176, at 10.  
 283.  MedPAC identified sixty-six groups of services within the Medicare Ambulatory Payment 
Classification (APC) system that it recommended to move to site-neutral payment because they do not 
require additional standby capacity or have other features that would justify added facility fees. 
MEDPAC 2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 158, at 28. 
 284.  See generally 42 U.S.C § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (2012), which gives states the authority to 
determine Medicaid rates and methodologies for determining the rates in their Medicaid state plans for 
approval by the federal government.  
 285.  See supra note 208 and accompanying text for a discussion of this part of the Connecticut 
law.  
 286.  See, e.g., Arielle Levin Becker, House Nearing Deal on Massive Health Care Bill, CONN. 
MIRROR (May 29, 2015), https://ctmirror.org/2015/05/29/house-nearing-deal-on-massive-health-care-
bill/; E-mail from Jennifer Macierowski, Chief Counsel and Dir. of Research, Conn. Senate Minority 
Office, to author (Oct. 22, 2015) (on file with author).  
 287.  Conn. Acts No. 15-146 § 13 (Reg. Sess.) (to be codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-508c). 
 288.  State Unfair and Deceptive Practices (UDAP) statutes generally mimic section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.” Unlike the FTCA, which may only be enforced by the FTC, however, state 
UDAP statutes generally permit private causes of action. Bob Cohen, Annotation, Right to Private 
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individual patients who have been charged unlawful facility fees or who 
have not received mandated notices about such fees a private right of 
action against providers. By contrast, Medicare patients do not have a 
private right of action if they are improperly charged cost-sharing 
payments for facility fees. 
C. Model Policy to Address Medical Debt Collection Practices 
A model policy would expand the fair debt collection requirements of 
the IRS’ rules for tax-exempt hospitals and fill its two main gaps: (1) the 
rules do not apply to for-profit or government-run hospitals, which make 
up over 40% of all hospitals in the U.S., or other types of providers, such 
as physicians289 and (2) the rules give hospitals complete discretion to 
determine eligibility for financial assistance, which is the trigger for the 
rules’ protections.290  
California’s Hospital Fair Pricing Act provides a model for a better 
approach—it limits the charges and collection activities of all California 
hospitals for uninsured patients who earn less than 350% of the federal 
poverty level or insured patients whose medical bills exceed 10% of 
household income.291 By defining the income and affordability thresholds, 
the policy would replace hospitals’ discretion in determining eligibility for 
fair billing and collection with level and predictable standards across all 
hospitals. However, a model policy would also apply debt collection 
requirements to physicians, urgent care centers, free-standing emergency 
rooms, and other types of providers. 
Connecticut provides a model for private enforcement of these 
requirements. It prohibits providers and their collection agents from suing 
to collect unpaid bills owing from out-of-network emergency care, 
surprise medical bills, or prohibited facility fees.292 In addition, the 
Connecticut statute makes it an unfair trade practice for any provider to 
report debts to credit reporting agencies stemming from prohibited 
surprise medical bills, bills for out-of-network emergency services, or 
facility fees.293  
 
 
Action Under State Consumer Protection Act—Preconditions to Action, 117 A.L.R. 5th 155, § 2[a] 
(2004).  
 289.  KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 237. 
 290.  See Fuse Brown, supra note 224, at 529–30.  
 291.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 127400-127446. 
 292.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-193(c).  
 293.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-7f(b)-(c).  
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The importance of designating medical billing practices as an unfair 
trade practice is twofold: first, it provides a valuable private remedy for 
those harmed by unfair and abusive consumer financial practices, and 
second, the availability of attorneys’ fees and punitive or treble damages 
creates valuable incentives for attorneys to take these cases on behalf of 
consumers. Nearly every state has a UDAP statute, and legislatures can 
designate certain health care billing practices as unfair trade practices 
under their state UDAP statute.294 Alternatively, the FTC could pursue 
enforcement or itself define certain medical billing practices as unfair and 
deceptive under the FTCA, which while not providing a private remedy, 
could have persuasive effects on states’ UDAP interpretations.295 The FTC 
has taken an interest in surprise medical bills, and pressure has been 
mounting from some in Congress for the FTC to investigate surprise 
medical billing.296 The FTC has expressed an interest in the role such bills 
play in causing narrow networks, a proven cost-saving mechanism, to fall 
into disfavor.297 
States can fill many of the substantive gaps in financial protections for 
health care consumers. Indeed, many of the best examples can be drawn 
from states themselves. Other examples come from the federal government 
(e.g., site-neutral payment) or a combination of federal, state, and private 
efforts (e.g., treatment of medical debts on credit reports). States can also 
go further than the federal government, typically through the creation of 
private remedies under consumer protection laws for medical billing 
 
 
 294.  For claims against health insurance carriers, the state could designate the practice a violation 
of the state’s Unfair Insurance Practices Act. Margot Sanger-Katz & Reed Abelson, Senator Calls for 
Inquiry into ‘Surprise’ Medical Bills, NY TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 3, 2016) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/upshot/senator-takes-up-issue-of-unexpected-medical-bills.html. 
 295.  Such a designation would apply to for-profit hospitals, physicians, and other facilities, but 
would potentially exclude nonprofit hospitals and those in the “business of insurance.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 
44, 45 (2012); Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 110th Cong. 1 (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/public_statements/ftc-testimony-reauthorization/p034101reauth.pdf. Note, however, that 
because self-funded health plans are not deemed to be in the business of insurance under ERISA, the 
FTCA could be applied to such self-funded ERISA plans. See infra note 360. 
 296.  Sanger-Katz & Abelson, supra note 294.  
 297.  See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Antitrust in 
Health Law Conference (May 12, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_ 
statements/950143/160519antitrusthealthcarekeynote.pdf (“Another ongoing study examines the 
frequency with which patients are treated by out-of-network providers when receiving care at in-
network facilities, potentially exposing them to significantly higher costs. One concern we have is that 
an increase in unexpected out-of-network costs could lead to the disfavoring of narrow networks, even 
though narrow networks are a proven means of lowering provider costs.”). One result of the FTC’s 
examination of surprise billing is the publication of a study on the incidence of surprise billing by two 
FTC economists. See Garmon & Chartock, supra note 45. 
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practices that are designated as unfair or deceptive acts or practices. This 
optimistic view of state innovation in consumer financial protections in 
health care, however, encounters a substantial structural barrier in the form 
of ERISA preemption. 
III. ERISA AND THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL SOLUTION 
The greatest shortfall in health care consumer financial protection is 
not substantive but structural. Even as more states are moving to adopt 
substantive patient financial protections, ERISA makes these laws 
inapplicable for a large proportion of consumers who get their health 
insurance from employer-based health plans. “ERISA” stands for the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the primary federal 
law that regulates employee benefit plans, including employer-based 
health plans.298 This structural gap in consumer financial protection in 
health care is more problematic than the substantive shortfalls because it 
cannot be overcome even by a willing state legislature. ERISA’s 
preemptive effects are extraordinarily broad and can result from express 
preemption under ERISA section 514299 or complete preemption of state 
remedies under ERISA section 502.300 This part demonstrates how both 
forms of ERISA preemption could render many state health care consumer 
protections inapplicable to consumers covered by employer based health 
care coverage and then suggests what a federal solution could look like.  
A. ERISA Preemption of State Consumer Financial Protections 
The Table in Appendix 1 summarizes which state health care consumer 
financial protection laws would be expressly preempted by ERISA with 
respect to self-funded plans under the deemer clause, saved from 
preemption with respect to fully insured employee health plans, or 
completely preempted by ERISA section 502. An analysis of ERISA 
preemption of states’ health care consumer protections is provided in more 
detail below.   
 
 
 298.  See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001); 
see also Health Plans & Benefits: ERISA, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-
plans/erisa (last visited May 20, 2017) (“The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) is a federal law that sets minimum standards for most voluntarily established pension and 
health plans in private industry to provide protection for individuals in these plans.”). 
 299.  29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2012).  
 300.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012).  
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1. Express Preemption Under ERISA Section 514 
ERISA expressly preempts any state law that “relates to an employee 
benefit plan.”301 This provision has been construed extremely broadly to 
displace a swath of state laws, including many state laws that regulate 
provision of or payment for health care, because of their impermissible 
connection to employee health plans.302  
Not all state laws that have some effect on ERISA plans “relate to an 
employee benefit plan.” The Court has noted that everything can be 
conceived of to relate to everything else, so if “relate(s) to” was taken 
literally, there would be no practical limits to ERISA’s express 
preemption.303 Particularly relevant to the health care consumer 
protections explored in this article, state laws that are primarily directed at 
health care providers that have only an incidental effect on ERISA plans 
would not “relate to” an employee benefit plan, and would not trigger 
ERISA’s express preemption.304  
Under this framework, state surprise medical billing laws that prohibit 
out-of-network providers from balance-billing patients in emergencies or 
for services at a facility that is in-network to the patient would not relate to 
an employee benefit plan.305 Similarly, state laws that limit providers’ 
medical debt collection and credit reporting practices would also escape 
 
 
 301.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of 
this subchapter and subchapter III . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .”). 
 302.  For example, state laws relate to ERISA plans if they: (1) mandate ERISA plans to cover 
certain benefits, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) (noting “the Disability Benefits 
Law, which requires employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly ‘relate to’ benefit plans.”); 
(2) interfere with nationally uniform plan administration, Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 
936, 946 (2016); or (3) intrude on the relationship between ERISA plans, beneficiaries, and 
administrators, Self-Ins. Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Snyder, 827 F.3d 549, 559 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding, in 
part, that the state law did not “relate to” ERISA because the state law did not intrude upon the 
relationships between ERISA-covered entities). 
 303.  See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (“If ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, 
then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course, for ‘[r]eally, universally, 
relations stop nowhere . . . .’”) (quoting H. JAMES, RODERICK HUDSON xli (New York ed., World's 
Classics 1980) (1875)).  
 304.  Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668 (holding a state law requiring hospital surcharges that “indirectly 
[affected] the relative prices of insurance policies” for ERISA plans was not preempted by ERISA); 
De Buono v. NYSA–ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 816 (1997) (holding that a state 
tax on hospitals, including medical centers operated by ERISA funds, only had an indirect impact on a 
self-insured employee health plan did not relate to an ERISA plan); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. 
Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 191 (4th Cir. 2007) (Citing DeBuono and Travelers to conclude, “States 
continue to enjoy wide latitude to regulate healthcare providers.”). 
 305.  See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668; De Buono, 520 U.S. at 816.  
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express preemption by ERISA.306 Laws requiring providers to provide 
patients with presumptively binding cost estimates would not relate to 
ERISA plans and thus also escape ERISA preemption.307 The key features 
of these laws are their requirements on providers instead of plans.308 
However, questions of ERISA preemption arise as soon as these laws 
regulate health plans—for example, state surprise billing laws typically 
include provisions for health plans, such as the requirement that plans hold 
patients harmless for surprise bills.309 
a. Savings Clause Analysis of Consumer Financial Protections 
A significant exception to ERISA’s express preemption provision 
derives from the “savings clause,” which saves from preemption state laws 
that regulate insurance.310 Thus, if they regulate insurance, states’ health 
care consumer protections directed at health plans will not be preempted. 
These insurance laws will apply to what are known in industry parlance as 
“fully insured” employee health plans, where the employer contracts with 
an insurance company to assume the financial risk for employees’ health 
care costs in exchange for premiums.311  
The Supreme Court articulated a two-part test to determine whether a 
state law regulates insurance in Kentucky Association of Health Plans v. 
Miller: first, the state law “must be specifically directed towards entities 
engaged in insurance,” and second, the state law “must substantially affect 
the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.”312 The 
second requirement will be met when the state statute “alter[s] the scope of 
permissible bargains between insurers and insureds.”313 
Several of the states’ consumer protections that are directed at health 
insurers would likely be saved from preemption under the savings clause 
because they regulate insurance, and would thus apply to fully insured 
employee health plans. For state surprise medical billing laws, these 
 
 
 306.  For a discussion of these laws, see supra notes 236–41 and accompanying text.  
 307.  For a discussion of this proposal, see supra Part II.B.  
 308.  See supra note 277–78 and accompanying text.  
 309.  For a tabular depiction of the ERISA preemption analysis for surprise billing laws, see infra 
Appendix 1.  
 310.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this 
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which 
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”).  
 311.  Approximately 39% of workers who are covered by employer-based plans are in fully 
insured plans. GARY CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 188. 
 312.  Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003).  
 313.  Id. at 338–39.  
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provisions include the requirement that plans ensure that enrollees only 
incur in-network cost-sharing for surprise bills,314 requirements for plans 
to include clauses regarding surprise billing in enrollee plan terms,315 and 
requirements for payments to out-of-network physicians to count toward 
insureds’ out-of-pocket costs and deductibles.316 These laws are directed at 
entities engaged in insurance, satisfying the first prong of the Miller test. 
For example, the Florida statute specifically states “[a]n insurer is solely 
liable for payment of fees to a nonparticipating provider . . . .”317 On the 
second prong, the laws alter the scope of permissible bargains by 
controlling the terms of the contract between the insurer and the insured.318 
For example, surprise billing laws may require health plans to pay for 
members’ bills from non-participating physicians. Consequently, the laws 
affect the insurers’ calculations of how to set rates based on their pre-
negotiated agreements with in-network providers as well as expected 
payments to out-of-network providers. These terms provide enrollees with 
substantive benefits and protections that, in essence, increase the level of 
coverage for out-of-network providers at in-network facilities.  
State network adequacy and provider directory laws would also likely 
constitute insurance regulation for the same reason that the state’s “any-
willing-provider” law was saved in Miller.319 Any-willing-provider laws 
require health plans to accept any provider who meets certain 
qualifications (such as licensure or willingness to accept the plan’s rates) 
into the plan’s network.320 Like any-willing-provider laws, network 
adequacy laws regulate and alter the number of in-network providers for 
 
 
 314.  See, e.g., N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 602(b)(2) (McKinney 2016) (“The health care plan shall 
ensure that an insured shall not incur any greater out-of-pocket costs for emergency services billed 
under a CPT code as set forth in this subsection than the insured would have incurred if such 
emergency services were provided by a participating physician.”). 
 315.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(a)(1) (establishing that “a health care 
service plan contract issued, amended, or renewed on or after July 1, 2017, shall provide that if an 
enrollee receives covered services from a contracting health facility at which, or as a result of which, 
the enrollee receives services provided by a noncontracting individual health professional, the enrollee 
shall pay no more than the same cost sharing that the enrollee would pay for the same covered services 
received from a contracting individual health professional. This amount shall be referred to as the ‘in-
network cost-sharing amount.’”).  
 316.  Id.  
 317.  FLA. STAT. § 627.64194(2) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 318.  See Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 338 (2003). 
 319.  Id. at 338–39 (“By expanding the number of providers from whom an insured may receive 
health services, AWP laws alter the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds . . . 
.”). 
 320.  Ashley Noble, Any Willing or Authorized Providers, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 
5, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/any-willing-or-authorized-providers.aspx.  
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enrollees of the plans.321 If there are inadequate participating providers, 
these laws may require the plans to cover out-of-network providers at in-
network rates and levels of benefits, which expands the network of 
providers like Kentucky’s any-willing-provider law in Miller.322 
State price transparency laws requiring the participation of health 
insurers would also be saved from preemption. The most robust state price 
transparency laws rely upon the collection of health care claims data by 
state-run APCDs. In Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the 
Supreme Court held that state APCD reporting requirements are 
preempted by ERISA.323 The Court did not discuss the applicability of the 
savings clause in its analysis, but the question was not before the Court in 
Gobeille because respondent Liberty Mutual was a self-funded ERISA 
plan.324 For fully insured employee benefit plans, the question is whether 
state APCD reporting requirements would be saved as insurance 
regulation. Such reporting laws provide the raw data that permit states to 
operate consumer price transparency tools and regulate insurance company 
premiums through rate review, among other functions.325 APCDs thus alter 
the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds by 
providing enrollees with certain benefits, such as price comparison tools; 
by regulating premiums; and by helping plans steer enrollees to high-value 
providers through cost-sharing incentives. 
In sum, to the extent state surprise billing, network adequacy, or price 
transparency laws require compliance by health plans, many of these laws 
could be saved from ERISA preemption and thus extend to consumers 
who are covered by fully insured employee health plans. The analysis is 
reversed for those covered by self-funded employee health plans. 
b. Deemer Clause Analysis of Consumer Financial Protections 
 Although ERISA’s savings clause saves state insurance regulation 
from preemption, the “deemer clause” creates an exception from the 
 
 
 321.  Miller, 538 U.S. at 339 (“No longer may Kentucky insureds seek insurance from a closed 
network of health-care providers in exchange for a lower premium. The AWP prohibition substantially 
affects the type of risk pooling arrangements that insurers may offer.”). 
 322.  See, e.g., NAIC MODEL ACT § 5.C. 
 323.  See generally 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016). 
 324.  Brief for Petitioner at 8, Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016) (No. 14-
181). 
 325.  See, e.g., Letter from Senator Ron Wyden & Senator Patty Murray to Sylvia Mathews 
Burwell, Secretary of Health & Human Servs, & Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of Labor (May 18, 2016), 
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/apcd%20letter_final_RWPM.pdf.  
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savings clause, preempting all state laws that relate to self-funded group 
health plans, which are not deemed to be in the business of insurance.326 
Thus, even state insurance laws that would be saved by the savings clause 
with respect to fully insured plans are preempted by ERISA insofar as they 
apply to self-funded employee health plans. The net effect is that ERISA 
preempts state laws that relate to employee benefit plans if they either do 
not qualify as insurance regulation or relate to self-funded employee health 
plans. 
Self-funded plans, also referred to as self-insured plans, are employee 
health plans where the employer pays for the health benefits with its own 
funds, retaining financial or insurance risk.327 Approximately 61% of all 
individuals who receive health insurance from an employer are insured by 
self-funded health plans.328 Typically, self-insured employers contract with 
third party administrators, entities that may also operate health insurance 
companies, to administer the benefits. To employees, it is far from clear 
whether their health plan is self-funded or fully insured—it may look as 
though Anthem or Cigna is their health insurer because the administrator 
issues insurance cards, manages the provider network, and handles the 
claims.  
Thus, even if all states were to adopt the model patient financial 
protection policies described in Part II, a large number of consumers, 
about a third of the nonelderly U.S. population,329 would be excluded from 
protection because of the sweeping preemptive effect of ERISA with 
respect to self-funded employee health plans.330 
2. Preemption of State Remedies by ERISA Section 502  
ERISA’s express preemption of state laws is but one way ERISA can 
block application of state laws to employee health plans. ERISA also 
 
 
 326.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
 327.  See e.g., Self-Funded Plans, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD, 
http://www.bcbsm.com/employers/products-services/health-insurance-plans/self-funded-plans.html 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2016); Advantages and Myths of Self-Funding for Employers with Fewer than 250 
Employees, CIGNA HEALTH & LIFE INS. CO. (Feb. 2014), http://www.cigna.com/assets/docs/ 
business/small-employers/841956_b_self_funding_whitepaper_v8.pdf (“Traditional self-funding is 
defined as when an employer pays for their own medical claims directly, while a third-party 
administrator administers the health plan by processing the claims, issuing ID cards, handling 
customer questions and performing other tasks.”). 
 328.  GARY CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 188. 
 329.  Id. at 188–200. In 2015, 56% of the nonelderly population was enrolled in employer-
sponsored coverage. Of those, 61% were enrolled in self-funded plans. So (56% * 61% = 34%).  
 330.  For a tabular depiction of the ways ERISA’s deemer clause alters the preemption analysis 
for self-funded plans, see infra Appendix 1.  
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broadly preempts state laws that provide additional remedies against 
employee health plans outside the limited remedies available in ERISA 
section 502.331 Known as complete or field preemption, ERISA’s 
extraordinary preemptive powers over state law remedies that duplicate, 
supplement, or supplant the ERISA remedies derive from courts’ 
interpretations that Congress intended ERISA to occupy the field and 
prevent the application of state-specific remedies to ERISA plans.332 
Although it only applies to state law remedies, section 502 preemption is 
broader than ERISA’s express preemption insofar as it applies to all 
ERISA plans, whether self-funded or fully insured.333 The question is 
whether the state law gives beneficiaries additional remedies beyond 
ERISA’s exclusive list. 
The two remedies among all the state laws discussed in this article that 
may be subject to complete preemption under ERISA are the dispute 
resolution provisions in state surprise billing laws and the UDAP causes of 
action against health plans for violations of surprise billing requirements. 
Although it is not clear that every state’s dispute resolution requirements 
would be preempted under ERISA section 502, a UDAP remedy against 
an ERISA plan would almost certainly be preempted.334 
a. Dispute Resolution Provisions 
In Rush Prudential v. Moran, the Supreme Court suggested that 
“common arbitration” would constitute a state law remedy that would be 
preempted by ERISA section 502, but a state requirement for independent 
medical review of coverage denials would not.335 The key question for 
state surprise billing laws is whether their dispute resolution mechanisms 
more closely resemble common arbitration or independent review 
procedures.  
 
 
 331.  29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012). 
 332.  Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208–09 (2004). Any claim against an ERISA 
plan that falls within the scope of an ERISA claim under section 502 is converted to a federal ERISA 
claim and is removable to federal court. Id. at 209. 
 333.  See Davila, 542 U.S. at 216–17 (“Respondents also argue . . . that the [state law] is a law 
that regulates insurance, and hence that ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) saves their causes of action from pre-
emption (and thereby from complete pre-emption). This argument is unavailing. The existence of a 
comprehensive remedial scheme can demonstrate an overpowering federal policy that determines the 
interpretation of a statutory provision designed to save state law from being pre-empted.”) (internal 
quotes and citations omitted).  
 334.  For a summary of how ERISA § 502 may preempt state consumer financial protection laws 
providing for dispute resolution or UDAP remedies, see infra Appendix 1.  
 335.  Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 381–82 (2002). 
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In Moran, the Court noted key features of arbitration, including a 
binding decision on the merits, a decision based on evidence submitted by 
the parties and subject to cross-examination at a hearing, and the breadth 
of power of the arbitrator such as the power to subpoena witnesses or 
administer oaths.336 The Court conceded that the independent review bore 
some resemblance to arbitration because the independent reviewer 
deliberates disputes about the meaning of the HMO contract and receives 
“evidence” in the form of medical records and statements from 
physicians.337 But, the state independent review law did not create an 
additional remedy like adjudication but was more akin to a second medical 
opinion because the independent reviewer lacked “free-ranging power to 
construe contract terms,”338 was confined to a narrow determination of 
medical necessity, did not hold an evidentiary hearing, and was required to 
be a physician and to exercise independent medical judgment.339 The 
majority rejected the dissenters’ argument that because the independent 
reviewer’s decision was binding, the process was akin to arbitration.340  
The binding dispute resolution provisions of New York and 
California’s surprise billing statutes share some similarities with the 
independent review mechanism in Moran. First, the independent dispute 
resolution inquiry is confined to one narrow issue—deciding which rate 
most closely resembles UCR.341 Second, the decision-maker does not have 
free-ranging power to construe plan terms or to independently determine 
what UCR should be, but is limited instead to selecting between two 
choices of fees.342 Semantically, however, the laws call these decision-
makers “independent dispute resolution entities,”343 and the power to 
determine payment rates (even if through baseball-style arbitration) is a 
task typically handled by courts or arbitrators, which does not seem 
analogous to what the court in Moran characterized as an independent 
physician giving a second medical opinion. 
 
 
 336.  Id. at 382–83 (internal quotes omitted) (citing 1 I. MACNEIL, R. SPEIDEL & T. 
STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 2.1.1 (1995)).  
 337.  Id. at 382. 
 338.  Id. at 383. 
 339.  Id.  
 340.  Id. at 394–95 (noting because the statute stated that “[i]n the event that the reviewing 
physician determines the covered service to be medically necessary, the [HMO] shall provide the 
covered service,” the review decision was a binding determination) (emphasis in original). 
 341.  N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 607(a)(6) (McKinney 2016); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 
1371.30(c), 1371.31(a)(1)). 
 342.  N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 607(a)(6) (McKinney 2016); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 
1371.30(c), 1371.31(a)(1)). 
 343.  N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 607(a)(4) (McKinney 2016); Assemb. B. 72 § 1, 2015-2016 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (to be codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1371.30(c), 1371.31(a)(1)). 
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The Texas mediation framework includes some provisions that 
resemble adjudication. First, both the nonparticipating physician and the 
plan “may present information regarding the amount charged for the 
medical service or supply.”344 Moreover, only individuals who have been 
trained in alternative dispute resolution techniques will qualify as 
mediator.345 But, unlike New York or California, the mediation process in 
Texas is not binding, and like in Moran, the inquiry is limited to two 
narrow issues—the amount to be paid to the out-of-network physician and 
the enrollee’s cost-sharing amount.346  
Florida’s law may come closest to providing a remedy that resembles 
traditional adjudication. In Florida, any dispute regarding payment 
amounts to out-of-network providers under its surprise medical billing 
law, “shall be resolved in a court of competent jurisdiction or through the 
voluntary dispute resolution process.”347 This dispute resolution 
organization has authority to review a wide variety of unresolved claims 
between health plans and non-contracted providers under evidentiary and 
hearing procedures that resemble common arbitration.348  
ERISA’s statutory remedies are available to enrollees of ERISA 
plans.349 But the ERISA preemption analysis remains unchanged even if 
state dispute resolution mechanisms remove the beneficiary from the 
dispute, leaving the plan and physician to work out payment. For example, 
in New York, the insured “assigns benefits to [the] non-participating 
physician” who then resolves the balance bill with the health care plan.350 
Under ERISA, the term “beneficiary” is defined as a “person designated 
by a participant or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or 
may become entitled to a benefit thereunder.”351 Thus, when the insured 
 
 
 344.  TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.056 (b) (West 2016). 
 345.  TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.052 (West 2017). 
 346.  TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.056 (a)(2) (West 2017). 
 347.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.64194(6) (West 2016).  
 348.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.7057 (West 2016). 
 349.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012) (“A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant or 
beneficiary (A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or (B) to recover benefits 
due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify 
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan”). A participant is a current or former employee 
who is eligible to participate in an employee benefit plan, and a beneficiary is someone designated by 
the participant (e.g., a family member) who is entitled to plan benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7), (8) 
(2012). ERISA § 502(a)(2) also allows the Secretary of Labor or a plan fiduciary (e.g., administrator) 
to bring other causes of action that are not relevant here. 
 350.  N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 607(a) (McKinney 2016). 
 351.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (2012) (emphasis added). The ERISA definition of “participant” is 
“any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an employee 
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assigns his or her benefits to the non-participating physician, the non-
participating physician is designated to receive the benefits under the 
ERISA plan and steps into the shoes of the beneficiary.352 Consequently, 
even though the beneficiary does not participate in the dispute resolution, 
the dispute resolution mechanism may still duplicate, supplement, or 
supplant ERISA’s remedies for beneficiaries.  
In sum, it remains unresolved whether courts will conclude that 
independent dispute resolution processes included in state surprise medical 
billing laws will be preempted by ERISA section 502. Relevant factors 
will include the extent to which the dispute resolution entity’s authority is 
limited to a narrow determination of the amount to be paid to the non-
participating provider, the evidentiary and hearing procedures used, and 
the degree to which the process resembles common arbitration or 
adjudication. ERISA plans will argue, perhaps successfully, that these 
alternative dispute resolution procedures are akin to arbitration, which run 
afoul of ERISA’s exclusive civil enforcement scheme. It seems like a 
close call in New York, California, and Texas, where there are some 
features that weigh against section 502 preemption, similar to Moran. 
Florida’s dispute resolution provision seems to tilt more clearly towards 
preemption. The Court’s recent willingness to expand as opposed to 
contract ERISA preemption and courts’ “reluctan[ce] to tamper with an 
enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the one in 
ERISA,”353 could result in widespread preemption of alternative dispute 
resolution programs for surprise billing for all consumers with employer-
based coverage. 
b. UDAP remedies for surprise billing violations 
 ERISA’s complete preemption under section 502(a) likely poses an 
insurmountable barrier to plaintiffs trying to bring an unfair trade practice 
claim under state law against an ERISA plan for surprise billing. For 
 
 
organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit 
plan which covers employees of such employer or members of such organization, or whose 
beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (2012). 
 352.  See City of Hope Nat’l Med. Ctr. v. HealthPlus, Inc., 156 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(“[A] health care provider, as the assignee of a beneficiary, acquires derivative standing and is able to 
sue as a ‘beneficiary’ by standing in the shoes of his assignor.”). But see DB Healthcare, LLC v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Ariz. Inc., No. CV-13-01558-PHX-NVW, 2014 WL 3349920, at *7 (D. Ariz. 
July 9, 2014), aff'd, No. 14-16518, 2017 WL 1075050 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2017) (finding that without 
valid assignments, the provider-plaintiffs were not “beneficiaries” and were unable to sue to enforce 
ERISA). 
 353.  Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985).  
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example, Florida makes violations of the surprise billing prohibitions by 
health plans a violation of the state’s UDAP statute.354 As to whether the 
UDAP action supplements, supplants, or duplicates an ERISA remedy, 
state UDAP laws allow for a range of recoveries, including compensatory 
and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and other remedies not available 
under an ERISA remedy.355 UDAP remedies against plans thus improperly 
supplement the ERISA remedies, triggering complete preemption.  
In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, the Court supplied a test for 
determining whether a claim falls within the scope of and is therefore 
preempted by ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B):  
if an individual brings suit complaining of a denial of coverage for 
medical care, where the individual is entitled to such coverage only 
because of the terms of an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan, 
and where no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA or 
the plan terms is violated, then the suit falls ‘within the scope of” 
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).356 
Applying the test articulated in Davila, the first question is whether the 
beneficiary bringing a UDAP claim against a plan for repeated violations 
of the surprise billing law is complaining of a denial of coverage of 
medical care, where the individual is only entitled to such coverage 
because of the terms of an ERISA plan.357 The answer, at least when 
applying Florida’s law, is yes because the health plan’s failure to hold the 
enrollee harmless for a surprise bill means that the plan has not paid for 
the out-of-network care that was supposed to be covered. Moreover, an 
individual is only entitled to such coverage because of the terms of an 
ERISA plan. An enrollee’s claim against a plan for nonpayment of any 
service is derived entirely from the particular rights and obligations 
established by the plan’s terms.358 In other words, if the enrollee’s asserted 
right to coverage that was denied is based on her enrollment in an ERISA 
 
 
 354.  FLA. STAT. §§ 456.072(1)(oo), 626.9541(1)(gg). Connecticut also makes surprise balance-
billing an unfair trade practice, but only for providers. Thus, Connecticut’s UDAP remedy would not 
implicate ERISA because it does not relate to employee benefit plans. 
 355.  Although the remedies vary by state, the majority of UDAP laws allow plaintiffs to recover 
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees, or compensatory damages and attorney 
fees. See Cohen, supra note 288.  
 356.  Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004). 
 357.  Id. at 210. 
 358.  Id. at 211 (noting that the only connection between the plaintiffs and the defendants Aetna 
and CIGNA were that the defendants administered the plaintiffs’ employee benefit plan, and 
concluding that the first prong of the test was satisfied). 
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plan, this first question is satisfied. Finally, the state law does not create an 
“independent legal duty” of the plan under the second question, because 
the plan has no independent duty to pay for services for an enrollee outside 
of the plan terms.359  
Thus, to the extent state laws extend UDAP remedies to health plans 
that violate surprise medical billing requirements, such laws would likely 
be completely preempted by ERISA section 502(a) for all ERISA 
employee health plans. 
B. Escaping ERISA’s Black Hole 
ERISA has grown far beyond the framers’ intent from a federal law 
that focused on regulating employee pension and retirement plans to a 
preemptive black hole that is increasingly consuming the field of state 
health and safety regulation.360 In the context of consumer financial 
protection, ERISA preemption excludes from protection a large and 
growing number of consumers whose are insured by self-funded employer 
health plans. Despite meaningful state innovation and leadership in the 
area of patient financial protection, the ERISA black hole means a federal 
solution is needed to protect all health care consumers from medical-bill 
related financial harms. 
Such a federal solution could take a few different forms: (1) pursue 
federal rulemaking by the Department of Labor to apply particular 
substantive requirements (e.g., surprise billing provisions, network 
adequacy, cost-sharing limits, price transparency reporting) to self-funded 
ERISA plans, (2) legislation to amend ERISA to allow state flexibility in 
terms of health care consumer protections that can be applied to self-
funded ERISA plans without preemption, or (3) pursue federal standards 
on surprise billing from the FTC that would apply to providers and all 
health plans.  
1. Regulation by the Department of Labor 
The Department of Labor (DOL) has authority over employee health 
plans under ERISA,361 so one option would be for DOL to issue rules 
 
 
 359.  Id. at 212–13 (concluding that there is no independent legal duty created by a state law that 
imposes liability or legal obligations on an ERISA health plan because plaintiffs’ state law claim 
“derives entirely from the particular rights and obligations established by the benefit plan”).   
 360.  See, e.g., Michael S. Sirkin, The 20 Year History of ERISA, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 321, 
322–23 (1994).  
 361.  NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, ERISA PREEMPTION PRIMER 3 (2009), 
http://www.nashp.org/erisa-preemption-primer/ (“The U.S. Department of Labor is responsible for 
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applicable to self-funded health plans on surprise medical bills and price 
transparency. For example, DOL could interpret its network adequacy 
standards to prohibit ERISA plans from counting surprise bills toward 
annual out-of-pocket maximums.362 DOL could require ERISA plans to 
make it transparent to enrollees when they receive care from an out-of-
network provider and what it may cost the enrollee to see the out-of-
network provider.363 However, it is unclear whether DOL has the existing 
statutory authority to require ERISA plans to hold patients harmless from 
surprise bills.364 Mark Hall has suggested that where DOL lacks the 
authority to mandate protections by group health plans, DOL could 
incentivize voluntary protections by creating a safe harbor that would 
shield employers from claims that they breached their fiduciary duties to 
enrollees under ERISA if the employer complied with provisions 
protecting enrollees from surprise medical bills.365 Such a safe harbor 
could establish a federal standard for protections against surprise bills, 
including requirements to hold enrollees harmless from surprise bills, 
participating in dispute resolution, or accede to out-of-network payment 
limits. Finally, DOL could clarify through guidance that states retain the 
authority to regulate providers, such as defining or capping providers’ out-
of-network rates, surprise billing prohibitions on providers, and providers’ 
 
 
administering and enforcing the ERISA law and setting policy for the conduct of employee benefit 
plans.”).  
 362.  Public Health Service Act (PHSA) § 2707(b), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(b) (2012) (requiring 
group health plans to limit annual cost-sharing by enrollees as provided in PHSA § 1302(c), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13022(c) (2012)). See Mark Hall, How the Department of Labor Can Help End Surprise Medical 
Bills, BROOKINGS (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/2016/12/14/how-the-department-of-
labor-can-help-end-surprise-medical-bills/; see also DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 69 (discussing limits 
and guidelines for ERISA plans’ use of network designs, particularly reference pricing, to evade 
annual cost-sharing limits). 
 363.  42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012) (setting forth cost-sharing transparency requirements for 
Exchange plans); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15a (2012) (requiring group health plans to provide the 
information required of Exchange plans in 42 U.S.C. § 18031); 29 U.S.C. § 1185d (2012) 
(incorporating the ACA’s market reforms for exchange and other health insurance plans into ERISA 
with respect to group health plans).  
 364.  To the extent DOL lacks authority under ERISA to promulgate any of these rules, it 
underscores the enormity of the black hole created by ERISA. ERISA preemption means that states’ 
health care consumer financial protections cannot be enforced against self-funded ERISA plans, but 
ERISA itself may not provide the DOL (or any other agency) the authority to promulgate parallel 
federal requirements of self-funded plans. In other words, no one—neither the states nor the DOL—
has the authority to regulate self-funded health plans on these matters. 
 365.  See HALL ET AL., supra note 25.  
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collection practices.366  
On price transparency, DOL could use its authority under the ACA and 
ERISA to require self-funded health plans to report a standardized set of 
health care claims data to state APCDs and DOL.367 The statutory 
authority for DOL to require ERISA plans to submit health care claims 
data is derived from Public Health Service Act (PHSA) section 2715A, 
which authorizes collection of data on health care costs and payments, and 
section 2717, which authorizes collection of data on health care quality. 
Both provisions were among those health insurance reforms created by the 
ACA and applied to group health plans by ERISA section 715. In addition, 
DOL has authority to collect data under the provisions of ERISA sections 
104 and 505, which authorize DOL to promulgate regulations and require 
any information or data from plans as necessary to carry out the purposes 
of the statute.368 
 The problem, politically and technically, is that federal rulemaking or 
legislation will be required on an issue-by-issue basis.369 ERISA requires 
that self-funded plans be subject to nationally uniform standards, and so 
federal standards would need to be crafted in each area of consumer 
protection, absent significant change to ERISA’s scope. Where substantive 
consumer protections are beyond DOL’s statutory authority under ERISA, 
additional legislation by Congress would be required.370 A second 
challenge is that much of DOL’s substantive statutory authority to regulate 
group health plans’ networks, transparency, or consumer protections were 
established by the ACA’s health insurance reforms, and many of these 
provisions may be rolled back or altered in an ACA replacement.371 Thus, 
the administrative solution through DOL rulemaking may depend heavily 
 
 
 366.  See Nicholas Bagley, A Small Step Forward on Surprise Billing, THE INCIDENTAL 
ECONOMIST (Dec. 20, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/a-small-step-
forward-on-surprise-billing/.  
 367.  See National Academy for State Health Policy, Comment on Proposed Changes to Annual 
Reporting Requirements for Employee Benefits Plan (Sept. 20, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EBSA-2016-0010-
0033&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing a legal analysis 
for DOL’s authority to collect health care claims data and to partner with state APCDs to through 
cooperative agreements to collect health care claim data from self-funded ERISA plans and report 
such data to DOL). 
 368.  Id. 
 369.  President Trump has expressed hostility to federal regulation, for example, by issuing an 
executive order that purports to require two rules be eliminated for every new rule. Reducing 
Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 
2017). 
 370.  HALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 24.  
 371.  See supra notes 360–61, 365–66 and accompanying text.  
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on Congress. 
2. Amend ERISA  
The second approach would be to seek legislation to carve out certain 
state consumer protection laws that require participation of health plans 
(e.g., surprise medical billing requirements or transparency and reporting 
to state APCDs) from ERISA’s preemptive scheme, replacing it with 
ordinary conflict preemption.372 Under conflict preemption, state laws are 
only preempted if they conflict with federal law, as opposed to ERISA’s 
express preemption scheme which preempts all state laws if they relate to 
employee benefit plans, whether or not they conflict with ERISA.373 This 
change would permit states to experiment with additional or different 
consumer protections, but allow federal standards to be established where 
desired. The challenge here is largely political.374 Even though ERISA has 
strayed far beyond its original scope in 1974, the current political climate 
is generally deregulatory and may favor business interests—the self-
funded plan sponsors—over the interests of individual consumers.375 The 
effect of ERISA preemption is not just national uniformity of standards for 
employers sponsoring benefit plans, but also light-touch regulation 
(compared to regulation by states) to entice multi-state employers to 
continue to offer employee benefits. Nevertheless, to the extent that states 
are being asked to assume more responsibility for their health care 
systems, and Republican plans to replace the ACA all depend on 
consumerism and high levels of cost-sharing, there could be some support 
for limited carve-outs to ERISA to open the door for state health consumer 
protections and transparency efforts.  
 
 
 
 
 372.  See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Body of Preemption: Health Law Traditions and the 
Presumption Against Preemption, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 95, 103 (2016).   
 373.  Id.  
 374.  See Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 1, 12 
(2017) (“[B]ecause of the intensity of the business lobby's resistance to limiting ERISA's preemptive 
scope, Congress is very unlikely to amend the law to address the concern”). 
 375.  See, e.g., Michael Corkery, Trump Expected to Seek Deep Cuts in Business Regulations, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/business/dealbook/ 
trump-expected-to-seek-deep-cuts-in-business-regulations.html; Nick Timiraos & Andrew Tangel, 
Donald Trump’s Cabinet Selection Signals Deregulation Moves Are Coming, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-cabinet-picks-signal-deregulation-moves-are-
coming-1481243006.  
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3. FTC Designation of Surprise Billing as an Unfair Trade Practice 
Finally, the federal consumer protection standards could come from the 
FTC designating surprise medical billing as an unfair trade practice. 
Although an FTC rule would not apply to nonprofit hospitals or insurers, it 
would apply to self-funded plans, filling one of the major gaps created by 
ERISA preemption.376  
One challenge of a federal designation of surprise billing as an unfair 
trade practice is determining whose conduct would be targeted by such a 
ruling. For example, if the FTC determined that it is an unfair trade 
practice for self-funded plans to charge members higher cost-sharing or 
refuse to hold members harmless for surprise bills, who would bear the 
risk of noncompliance, the employer that maintains the self-funded plan or 
the third-party administrator that handles the administrative functions of 
plan design, network participation, and claims processing? Perhaps both, 
where the employer plan sponsor can be deemed to engage in an unfair 
trade practice if its third-party administrator does not abide by these 
requirements, whether contractually or in practice. In addition, the FTC 
standard should apply to providers, such as out-of-network physicians, 
prohibiting balance-billing or imposing higher cost-sharing on the patient 
when the patient was not fully informed of provider’s out-of-network 
status and given a meaningful opportunity to select an in-network 
provider.  
A further question and potential drawback of this approach is whether 
it would cut short salutary state experimentation and replace it with a 
national standard. If states lose flexibility to layer additional protections 
above the federal standard, then the benefits of state innovation will be 
lost.377  
Federal standards for consumer financial protection in health care are 
not unheard of—under the Obama administration, the ACA and other 
federal policies, such as site-neutral Medicare payments, have made 
several regulatory inroads.378 These federal policies generally permit state 
flexibility to impose additional requirements above the federal floor or for 
 
 
 376.  The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that FTCA “shall be applicable to the business of 
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). 
ERISA provides that self-funded plans are not deemed to be “engaged in the business of insurance . . . 
for the purposes of any law of any State . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2012). Thus, self-funded plans, if not 
engaged in the business of insurance, should be subject to FTC jurisdiction. 
 377.  See Bagley, supra note 374, at 2. 
 378.  For a discussion of the ACA’s limits on cost-sharing see supra Part I.A.1; on network 
adequacy see supra Part I.A.2; and on site-neutral payments in Medicare see supra Part I.B.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION IN HEALTH CARE 199 
 
 
 
 
populations not covered by the federal standard. Nevertheless, the Trump 
administration has signaled hostility to expanding regulatory efforts to 
protect health care consumers.379 The federal solution to expand state-
based consumer financial protections in health care may be elusive until 
the political climate changes.   
In the absence of a federal solution, states will continue to be the 
sources of innovation and legislative reform. The first strategy for states to 
limit the effect of ERISA preemption is to promulgate measures that limit 
the medical billing practices of providers, while continuing to include 
requirements of non-ERISA plans (fully insured, non-group plans, state 
employee plans, or Medicaid).380 Second, states can encourage voluntary 
participation by self-funded ERISA plans by demonstrating to employers 
and plan sponsors the benefits of transparency for more value-based 
provision of health care for their members.381 Finally, the actions of FICO, 
the three major credit agencies, in collaboration with federal (CFPB) and 
state authorities illustrate how meaningful consumer protection can 
emerge on a national scale through a combination of approaches—public 
and private, voluntary and mandated, and state and federal.382  
CONCLUSION 
Every generation has attempted to reform health care and protect 
patients from the worst perceived abuses of the time. The ACA focused on 
expanding coverage and reforming insurance practices. The assumption 
has always been that gaining health coverage protects people from the 
financial health risks. That is the classical model—the individual 
purchases insurance to shift the financial risk of health care consumption 
to the insurer. In the managed care revolution in the 1980s and 1990s 
insurers further shifted that financial risk to providers.383 Recently, the 
 
 
 379.  HHS Secretary Tom Price has made statements in the past in favor of permitting balance-
billing in Medicare, for example. President Trump also wants to repeal Dodd-Frank, which created and 
gives CFPB its authority. See supra notes 141, 242–43.  
 380.  See supra notes 297–300 and accompanying text. 
 381.  See Fuse Brown & King, supra note 185. 
 382.  See supra notes 258–63 and accompanying text.  
 383.  See Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 55, 62 (2002) (discussing managed care plans’ attempt to “ration financing . . . [and] control 
costs by inducing their provider-subcontractors to assume substantial financial risks for the care they 
undertake to provide”); Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial Risk 
Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. 
REV. 1, 6 (1993) (“Under managed care products, the risk of financial loss shifts from third-party 
payers to physicians.”). 
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emphasis on consumerism has resulted in a shift of significant financial 
risk back to patients.  
The importance of gaining health insurance coverage for a household’s 
financial security and stability is undisputed. But the lesson here is that 
gaining coverage is not the end of the battle, especially as increased cost 
shifting is making that coverage less robust. The next frontier for patient 
financial protection is getting at harm to patients as consumers. States 
have been out front with innovative policies, but because of the expansive 
nature of ERISA preemption, these state innovations will never reach a 
large and growing segment of the population. Thus, unless ERISA 
changes, federal protections for health care consumers will be necessary.  
The story of consumer financial protection in health care is a tale of 
regulatory pluralism across methods (caps, disclosure, private remedies, 
and incentives) and across institutions (state and federal, public and 
private, legislative, administrative, and judicial). On the one hand, the 
story tells of a dynamic interplay where each method and institution acts 
to create standards, reinforce protections, and fill gaps. But it also is a 
story of the perils of preemption and regulatory conflict that threatens the 
experimental and reinforcing benefits of regulatory pluralism. There is no 
one approach that will suffice—the strength of consumer financial 
protections in health care depend on the overlapping efforts of many 
regulatory tools and institutions. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table. ERISA Preemption Analysis for State Health Care Consumer 
Protection Laws 
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